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Several factors influence the performance of the labour market. Amongst these
factors, the parameters of the general transfer systems and tax rates have important
effects on both labour demand and labour supply. The supply side of the labour
market is affected by tax and transfer systems through their impact on economic
incentives for work. More precisely, there are two elements affecting labour supply:
the benefit level relative to earnings and the marginal increase in disposable income
when earnings rise. The first relates to the so-called unemployment trap and the
second to the poverty trap.
This note aims to examine the problem of the unemployment trap. The analysis of
economic incentives is primarily made with the help of the concept of net replacement
rates, which is defined as a ratio of disposable income based on social benefits when
out of work and disposable income gained from work.
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Until now, there have been relatively few comparative studies on net replacement
rates. Most of them are based on simulation calculations for a set of stylised
households, assuming an in-work situation as a starting point, and in the second
phase, an unemployment situation where the unemployment benefit is computed on
the basis of a given wage level according to the entitlement rules. This is known as the
H[DQWH approach. Additionally, the calculations take account of the interaction of
taxes and supplementary benefits like family and housing benefits and social
assistance.
The first comparisons of net replacement rates have been accomplished by a group of
national experts, known as the Seven Countries Group, and the Central Planning
Bureau in the Netherlands. Subsequently, the OECD has started to calculate regularly
net replacement rates covering a larger set of countries. The first studies relate to the
years 1993-95. These studies apply the same kind of ex ante analysis based on
simulation calculations for a set of stylised households. As a benchmark for cross-
country comparisons, the wage level of the “average production worker” (APW), as
defined by the OECD, has been chosen. The net replacement rates have been
calculated for a selection of family types with an income range below and above the
APW.
By and large, the aforementioned calculations of net replacement rates of
unemployment benefits lead to broadly similar conclusions. While there are
differences between the levels of replacement rates in various calculations due to
differences in detailed assumptions, the country rankings are very similar. The5
calculations allow the distinction to be made between groups of countries with –
arbitrarily defined - high, intermediate and low replacement rates. High replacement
rates are found in Luxembourg, Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, France and
Portugal. Intermediate replacement rates are found in Austria, Belgium, Germany,
Spain and the United Kingdom and the lowest rates in Greece, Ireland and Italy. The
net replacement rates for low-wage earners are above 70 per cent in almost all
countries; they are below that only in Austria, Ireland and Italy for single persons and
couples without children and only in Italy for families with children.
(PSLULFDOVWXGLHV
The stylised calculation method has given rise to discussion for a number of reasons
such as i) different results in various studies, ii) non-representative stylised
households and iii) sensitivity to various assumptions.
Empirical studies are important to verify the results of the stylised approach, in order
to verify whether the actual net replacement rates are as high as the simulated ones
and to check how many individuals or households are affected by such replacement
rates. Moreover, whilst capturing the variation in household situations and the actual
relevance of these situations, these studies can also provide additional information on
average measures and distribution of replacement rates.
In computing net replacement rates, in principle, two different labour market
situations of the same individual are compared with each other. However, in practice,
the available empirical cross-sectional data do not allow the same individuals to be
followed longitudinally. Therefore, different groups of unemployed and employed are
compared, based on the assumption that these groups have otherwise similar
characteristics, and thereby resulting in a non-conventional interpretation of the
concept of net replacement rate.
The Commission services of DG II have conducted the present study of the net
replacement rates of the unemployed (hereafter, DG II study) on the basis of the first
wave of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) survey in 1993. In this
study the populations of unemployed and employed in working-age groups were
compared and the disposable income of the unemployed was compared with that of
the employed, thus aiming to give an empirical equivalent to the net replacement rate.
The concept of disposable income was calculated individually by allocating family-
related benefits to individuals of working age.
Previously, the services of DG V had conducted another study of net replacement
rates based on the same data but defining the target population and individual net
income differently.  In that study only the net monthly income during two different
labour market positions of those who had been unemployed and employed during the
reference year was compared, thus applying a concept of net benefit and net earnings
(excluding family-related benefits).
The main results of the present (DG II) study based on the ECHP Survey in 1993
suggest the following conclusions:6
(1) The average net replacement rate for all unemployed was 52 per cent and
64 per cent for those in low-income households. The highest net replacement
rate for all unemployed was found in Denmark, 74 per cent, whereas it was
around 50 per cent in most countries. Apart from Denmark, high replacement
rates in the sub-population of low-income households were found also in
Ireland, Germany and the United Kingdom.
(2) The take-up rate of benefits of all sorts (unemployment, housing, family
allowances, social assistance etc.) amongst all unemployed was at 67 per cent,
twice as high as the take-up rate of unemployment benefits alone, 33 per cent.
In Belgium, Denmark, Germany and Ireland over 90 per cent of all
unemployed received some benefits. The take-up rates of unemployment
benefits were notably low in many countries, especially in the southern
European countries.
(3) According to the ECHP survey, 32 per cent of individuals belonged to low-
income households, LH the disposable income was less than two thirds of the
average disposable income, ranging from 22 per cent in Denmark to 40 per
cent in Portugal. The share of the unemployed in low-income households was
59 per cent, almost twofold the share of all individuals, ranging from 37 per
cent in Denmark to 76 per cent in the United Kingdom.
(4) Around 60 per cent of all unemployed who received benefits had an out-of-
work income which was less than half of the average in-work income.
However, more than 20 per cent of the unemployed, about 2.5-3 million
people in 12 Member States, received an out-of-work income which was over
70 per cent of the average in-work income. In low-income households, one
third of the unemployed had an out-of-work income more than 70 per cent of
the average in-work income in low-income households and 16 per cent of the
unemployed had an income more than the average in-work income.
These figures will have to be handled with care. For instance, there are apparent
discrepancies in the quality of data in the ECHP survey. The ECHP has failed to
measure unemployment in a consistent manner with the Labour Force Survey. In the
ECHP survey unemployment is defined at the moment of the interview according to
the interviewed person’s own definition, whereas the Labour Force Survey requires
active job searching.  In some countries, the differences are moderate and can reflect
differences which are also found between the national administrative sources and the
Labour Force Survey. In some other countries, however, (Greece, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands and Portugal), the unemployment figures are far too high, and thus risk
erroneous conclusions on living conditions of the unemployed or on the calculation of
take-up rates. In fact, the lowest take-up rates of benefits were found in the countries
where the greatest discrepancies in unemployment figures between the ECHP and
Labour Force Surveys also existed.7
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The direct comparison of the results of empirical studies with those of stylised net
replacement calculations is inappropriate in many respects. First and foremost, two
completely different methodologies are compared. Even though they aim to capture
the same phenomena, strictly speaking the results describe different features of tax
and benefit systems. Ex ante net replacement rates for stylised households aim to
describe how the tax-benefit systems have been designed to work and how the
interaction of taxes and benefits affects the final outcome. Empirical net replacement
rates for actual households tell us how extensively people in reality exploit all the
possibilities which the tax-benefit systems offer. But additionally, they reflect the
influence of many other factors which, by definition, are excluded from stylised
calculations which reveal the “pure” impact of systems.
It is not easy to find proper summary measures for comparing results of different
approaches. In particular, the large variation in family and duration composition of
unemployment, which is caught in empirical studies, is difficult to display with
stylised measures. Even unemployment is not easy to define in the same way. Stylised
calculations consider the unemployed as a person who is eligible to draw
unemployment benefits, whereas the empirical data tend to show the unemployed in a
broader sense also possibly including non-employed persons. The differences may
also arise from the availability of benefits, which can be affected by reasons other than
the pure eligibility rules, HJ., the administration of benefits. Additionally, the
empirical studies referred to in this report differ from the stylised calculations in
focusing the impact of unemployment. The unit of analysis of stylised calculations is
the household, whereas the empirical studies were conducted more on an individual
level. Moreover, the DG V study applied a narrower concept of disposable income
than the DG II study or the stylised calculations.
The differences in the approaches of the two empirical studies (DG II and DG V)
reflect, on the one hand, the complexity of the subject and the multiplicity of
definitions which the data allow, and on the other hand, the as yet unestablished
practice in research. While the present study, compiled by DG II, tries to examine the
whole extent of unemployment and the economic living standard of the unemployed
in relation to that of the employed, the DG V study tries to have better control of
economic changes in circumstances where individuals move in and out of
employment.
Whilst keeping in mind the previous elements of caution, the results of stylised and
empirical net replacement rates can be compared tentatively. There are two
benchmarks for stylised calculations: the net replacement rate of the first month of
unemployment and that of the 60
th month. While the DG II approach covers all
unemployed, neither the first month’s nor 60
th month’s rate perfectly correspond to the
“average” duration of unemployment in real data. The approach of DG V is closer to
the first month of unemployment because the study was confined to those having been
both unemployed and employed during the reference year. Yet, the following
conclusions can be made:8
(1) For about half of the countries, there was a fair match between empirical
and stylised results. However, the empirical replacement rates were in some
countries significantly lower than the stylised rates. Notably this was the case
in the Netherlands and Luxembourg where these two approaches gave quite
different results: the stylised calculations result in high net replacement rates in
both countries, whereas the empirical study puts these countries amongst those
with the lowest rates. Also in Belgium, Germany and the United Kingdom
empirical replacement rates were somewhat lower than the stylised ones.
(2) There seems to be less variation in empirical average net replacement rates
between countries than between the stylised ones. If some exceptional values
are excluded, the empirical average replacement rates varied within the range
of 44-56 per cent, whereas the stylised rates varied within the range of 61-87
per cent for the first month’s compensation and 46-82 per cent for the sixtieth
month’s compensation.
A great number of variables affecting the comparison between stylised and empirical
calculations could not be properly controlled. First of all, as was pointed out above,
the definition of unemployment is not easy, and different surveys seem to give it
different content. Moreover, other studies suggest that a great deal of income
differences between the groups of unemployed and employed are due to differences in
household and individual characteristics affecting the composition of the groups
compared. In addition to this aspect, other studies draw attention to the economic
impact at household level and its consequences for individual work incentives. It is
evident that taxes and family-related benefits are an integral part of the social
protection system, which influence the disposable income of the family of the
unemployed and thereby also the work incentives of unemployed family members.
Family-related benefits were only included in the DG II study.
&RQFOXGLQJUHPDUNV
Unemployed people are sometimes eligible to benefits other than unemployment
benefits, such as training allowances, specific allowances to laid-off people or social
assistance while, on the other hand, some non-employment benefits such as early
retirement or disability benefits may increase the number of people affected by work
incentive problems. The present study is confined to studying individuals who were
defined as unemployed. However, taking into account the large differences in the
numbers of unemployed between the ECHP and Labour Force Surveys, it seems
evident that the ECHP figures include a large number of non-employed people as
well. Basically, their benefits, possibly related to non-employment, were also included
in the DG II study. This broader concept of unemployment could be an advantage in
order to have a larger view of work incentive problems. But, the study was not based
on a clear definition of the inclusion of all non-employed in the target group, and most
likely did not include all non-employed. However, for the purpose of comparison of
results with the stylised calculation this is an obvious disadvantage. Therefore, a
clearer distinction between the unemployed and non-employed would be desirable.9
International comparisons of the incidence and distribution of high net replacement
rates have suffered from the lack of appropriate data. The European Community
Household Panel will improve the situation considerably, in particular, when
longitudinal data will be available. It allows further progress to be made in comparing
economic living standards of the unemployed and the non-employed relative to that of
the employed as well as in examining labour market patterns and transitions and
estimating the labour supply parameters.
Whilst appropriate data will allow more reliable international comparisons, the latter
do not allow conclusions to be drawn on work disincentives and the extent of
unemployment traps. National experiences of the use of microsimulation models in
examining the incidence and distribution of high replacement rates will allow one to
bridge that gap. Only the simulation approach allows the possibility to examine
replacement levels and thereby work incentives at the individual level, LH the likely
benefit level of those in employment or the likely wage level of the unemployed. This
kind of model would offer a powerful tool for analysing work incentives and labour
market transitions.10
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In the European Union there are about 18 million people unemployed. In most
countries unemployment has been increasing from one economic cycle to the next.
According to the surveys, a further 9 million people are not registered as unemployed,
but would be willing to sign up for a job if labour market prospects improve. The
average participation rate in Europe is around 60 per cent, compared with more than
70 per cent in the United States and Japan. Furthermore, half of the unemployed have
been out of work for more than a year and the majority of them have low educational
levels.
Welfare systems are often indicated as amongst the main culprits for the
unemployment  development. Present European welfare programmes were created for
labour markets with one male breadwinner, working in manufacturing or construction,
and where unemployment was low and essentially cyclical. Most benefit systems have
been designed for situations where the need for benefits is infrequent and of limited
duration. Second, they have been designed for a population where participation rates
were high and people could expect an uninterrupted working life. This picture does
not correspond with that of the present labour market. There is more diversity in
working and family patterns than in the days when benefit systems were introduced.
The unemployment level is higher and unemployment spells have become longer,
part-time work has increased, short-term contracts are more frequent, participation
rates of men have declined and those of women increased. These current and
foreseeable features of the labour markets and economic environment are gradually
undermining elements of tax and benefit systems.
Tax and benefit systems failures can also be caused by the fact that the welfare
systems were designed and introduced one at a time in the first half of this century.
While each one of the schemes might be well designed for its specific purposes, the
interplay in a more complicated world with other programmes, notably with taxes, has
proven not to work in a controlled and desired way. The individual schemes were
often also amended without controlling the ultimate outcome after the intervention of
other systems. So, the existing programmes may include unplanned and undesired
features which weaken the overall coherence and functioning of tax and benefit
systems and give rise to wrong behavioural incentives. The potential distortionary
effects on the functioning of the labour market arising from the lack of adjustment of
welfare systems to structural changes of labour markets may well result in an increase
in the equilibrium rate of unemployment.11
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Several factors influence the performance of the labour market. Amongst these
factors, beside the quality of the educational system and the effectiveness of active
labour market measures, the parameters of the general transfer systems and the tax
rates have important effects on both labour demand and labour supply.
As to the demand side of labour market, the tax system has effects on the overall
labour demand. Non-wage labour costs like employers’ social security contributions
provide a clear disincentive to hiring workers. This is, however, only one way in
which taxes affect the demand for labour. All taxes drive a wedge between the cost of
labour to the firm and the return (in terms of consumption) to the employee from
working. This tax wedge includes income taxes, social security contributions and all
consumption taxes. These taxes raise the price of labour and thereby affect the labour
demand.
The overall tax wedge has been increasing in European countries. The problem caused
by a large and growing tax wedge has been recognised in many countries. Most
countries have been seeking ways to reduce the tax wedge, but this has proved to be
extremely difficult because of the financial requirements of benefits and welfare
services. As a second-best solution, the structure and shape of the composition of
taxes has offered possibilities to partial reforms like reducing employers’ social
security contributions for all or targeted groups of workers, reshaping the structure of
contributions, and broadening the contributions’ base.  The measures taken have often
been directed to alleviate the hiring of certain groups like low-paid workers, long-term
unemployed, young or disabled people.
The supply side of labour market is affected by tax and benefits systems through their
impact on economic incentives for work. As regards the tax and benefit system, there
are two elements affecting labour supply: the benefit level in relation to earnings -
captured by the so-called replacement rates -, and the increase in disposable income
when earnings rise - the so-called marginal effective tax rates. The first relates to the
so-called unemployment trap and the second to the poverty trap (OECD 1996a).
The unemployment trap is defined as a situation where benefits paid to the
unemployed and their families are high relative to earnings, and more precisely, when
disposable income gained from benefits is high relative to that gained from work so
that working “does not pay”. A high benefit level reduces the economic incentive to
move from unemployment to paid employment or can push individuals, especially
those at a lower wage level, to turn to social benefits or to withdraw entirely from the
labour market. Benefits are also important in wage setting. Even in the absence of a
legal minimum wage, minimum benefit level creates a wage floor, the so-called
reservation wage (LH., the wage level which gives the same living standard as the
minimum benefit).
The poverty trap is created when the increase in earnings due to higher work effort
does not lead to any, or leads only to a small, increase in disposable income due to
higher tax rates and to withdrawal of benefits. This is measured as marginal effective
tax rates (METR) which take into account both the increase in taxes and the reduction12
in benefits. The existence of high marginal taxes hampers the performance of the
market through a substitution effect: the incentive to increase supply of labour,
whether as additional working hours or as efforts improving quality of labour, is
reduced because the after-tax wage falls and the opportunity cost of leisure goes
down. The disincentives to acquire better qualifications of labour can decrease
vocational and geographical mobility.
All in all, unemployment benefits may have the following negative effects on the
functioning of labour markets and social welfare:
·  They may increase the duration of unemployment by helping the unemployed to
finance their job search. Usually, in insurance schemes, workers need not accept a
job offer if they deem it unsuitable. Especially, if the job offered would yield only a
small increase in income, the financial incentive for a worker to return to work
might be too low and encourage the search for something better.
·  They may increase the frequency of spells of unemployment by making seasonal
and other temporary employment patterns more attractive. In fact, unemployment
benefits make the financial rewards of such unstable jobs higher than would occur
otherwise. The subsidy reduces the costs associated with such labour. Employers
therefore, have little incentive to change existing hiring patterns.
·  They may affect labour force participation, inducing inactive people in the labour
force to search for a job and enter the labour force. The impact of increased labour
force participation is likely to extend the average duration of unemployment
because of the difficulty encountered in finding jobs by those individuals who
would otherwise be discouraged or not really interested in finding a job.
·  Finally, they may alter incentives in wage bargaining as workers will be less wary
of pushing up wages and thus risking their jobs.
The acknowledgement of possible work disincentives, arising from generous
unemployment insurance systems, and the fear that they may have played an important
role in high and persistent European unemployment in the 1980s, gave rise to a great
deal of attention, and the debate highlighted the conflicting principles underlying
policy in this area. On the one hand, social security should guarantee a reasonable
level of income to those out-of-work; on the other hand, it should not be provided in
such a way that people have little incentive to seek or accept jobs.
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In order to analyse the impact of unemployment benefits on unemployment, a number
of studies have compared the level of the out-of-work disposable income with the in-
work disposable income. Several methodologies have been and can be applied in
order to assess the living standard during unemployment compared to that in
employment.13
One approach is to calculate so-called replacement rates. Having regard to the
working of tax and benefit systems, one has to compare disposable income gained
from benefits with that gained from work. This means that, in addition to an exchange
of wage into unemployment benefits, the reaction of tax and other benefit, notably
means-tested, schemes has to be taken into account. Assuming “in-work” situation as
a starting point, this analysis allows to be computed H[ DQWH replacement rates.
Calculations for stylised households assuming a given set of wage levels and family
types can illustrate the shape and structure of replacement rates over an income range
for various family types. Nevertheless, this method cannot reply to questions on
average or most common replacement rates. For this purpose, representative statistics
on people’s economic situations are needed.
A simple statistical way to compare the living standard of unemployed and employed
persons or families is provided by household surveys, as they provide information on
the disposable income of various types of families. This approach provides an
empirical analysis showing what income levels people in different labour market
states actually receive.1 The ratio of disposable income between unemployed and
employed households can be interpreted as the statistical equivalent to net
replacement rates, even though it compares different households in different situations
and not the same households in different labour market situations.
Microsimulation models based on empirical data offer the most advanced way to
tackle the measurement problem. This approach is close to that of stylised household
calculations. However, when based on a representative sample of actual individuals, it
provides additional information on the average level and distribution of replacement
rates by various characteristics of households. The net replacement rates can be
computed to the employed by changing their labour market status, LH assuming that
they become unemployed and then calculating the unemployment and other (means-
tested) benefits according to their entitlement as well as their new taxes (ex ante
analysis). Respective calculations can be made for the unemployed as well, assuming
that they become employed at the same wage from which their prevailing
unemployment benefit was defined. This wage and inherent taxes and benefits can be
recalculated.
This study will analyse the living standard of unemployed individuals in comparison
with those in work. It compares various approaches to compute net replacement rates
and discusses their advantages and disadvantages. Furthermore, it aims to find
empirical evidence as to whether high net replacement rates, which have been found
by stylised calculations, are relevant in practice as well, and as to whether the average
disposable income of the unemployed corresponds to the net replacement rate of an
average or low-paid production worker.
Part I of this study compares earlier studies of net replacement rates for stylised
households. The approach of stylised calculations describes the structures and levels
                                                          
1  Sometimes this actual ratio is referred as H[SRVWreplacement ratio. However, in literature the H[
SRVWreplacement rate is used to mean the ratio between benefit income during unemployment and
the post-unemployment wage income. Therefore, we prefer to use the concepts of stylised and
empirical replacement rates in order to describe differences in approaches.14
of tax and benefit schemes. In order to make these descriptions internationally
comparable, a number of studies have adopted a so-called ‘Average Production
Worker’ wage level as the benchmark. The approaches and results of three different
studies are compared, namely those of the Seven Countries Group, the Central
Planning Bureau of the Netherlands and the OECD.
Part II consists of empirical studies. The European Community Household Panel
survey offers a new framework for international comparisons. The Commission
services have used the first wave of this data in two different studies in order to find
evidence for the net replacement rates found in stylised calculations. The results of
these studies are compared here. Moreover, the chapter makes reference to a Swedish
study on net replacement rates in which empirical data and microsimulation model
approach have been combined. Finally, in the conclusions the results of various
approaches are tentatively compared and the advantages and disadvantages of various
approaches are assessed.
Annex A makes a reference to the literature on the analyses of the impact of
unemployment benefits on unemployment.15
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Only a few studies have tried to accomplish comparisons of unemployment benefit
replacement rates among different countries. First, comparative studies have been
carried out by a group of national experts (Seven Countries Study) and the Central
Planning Bureau in the Netherlands (CPB). Subsequently, the OECD has started to
regularly calculate net replacement rates for stylised households covering a larger set
of countries. In all these studies the structure of benefit and tax systems and the
outcome of their interaction is analysed under the legislation in a given date and
assuming that the benefit and tax rules are applied as they stand in the legislation.
The common feature of the studies presented further on is that all calculations have
been carried out with an H[DQWH approach: stylised family types entitled to protection
of the welfare systems in a reference year have been defined, and the potential
replacement income has been calculated in a standardised way, in both gross and net
terms thus taking into account income taxation. In other terms, the basic assumption
in these calculations is that one works at a certain wage level and, in the second phase,
the person becomes unemployed and begins to receive the unemployment benefit
he/she is entitled to and possibly other means-tested benefits. Moreover, for the
disposable income of households, the family benefits, housing allowances and other
means-tested benefits have been recalculated as they are determined on the basis of
gross income in each case.
Net replacement rates are defined in all the studies considered as the ratio of
disposable income when unemployed to the disposable income when in work (out-of-
work income to in-work income). They have been calculated for a number of typical
cases, choosing as a benchmark for comparisons the OECD’s ‘average production
worker’ (APW), and calculating the replacement rates for a selection of family types
based on an income range below and above the APW (e.g. a single APW, a couple
with one APW and a dependent spouse, a couple with both partners being APW, or
one APW and the other 1/2 APW, one APW-couple with children, etc.). The
replacement rates then measure the percentage of previous earnings that each of these
family types will receive in case of unemployment.
As to the concept of gross income, they all refer to the one used in ‘The tax/benefit
position of production workers’ (OECD 1995). It says that the average wage of a
production worker in each country has been chosen as the benchmark of income level
and the income range investigated is related to the average wage level. To describe the
economic position of an unemployed person in comparison with an employed one,
disposable income is then calculated in a standardised way across countries: average16
wages or gross unemployment benefits, standard deductions and allowances in the
taxation system as well as inherent means-tested benefits are involved. However, there
are differences in details on how exactly and upon which assumptions the disposable
income has been calculated, e.g.,  concerning housing costs and benefits and payments
for day care for children. The OECD and CPB studies strictly follow the usual
definition of disposable income, i.e., housing benefits are included as means-tested
benefits but no deductions are made on the basis of necessary consumption like
moderate housing costs or childcare payments. Instead, the Seven Countries Study
applies a “Family purse” concept of the disposable income. It differs from the usual
disposable income as it reduces the moderate housing costs and measures the
disposable income which can be regarded as room for free-choice consumption.
Additionally, for some countries, “Family purse” income has been calculated after
childcare payments (net of subsidies).
I.1.1 OECD
In 1996, a Thematic Review of OECD (OECD 1996a) on the interactions between
taxes, benefits, employment and unemployment highlighted how some existing
features of tax and benefit systems can cause labour market disincentives, failing thus
to “make work pay”. Three failures of tax and benefit systems were given particular
attention: the unemployment trap (disincentives for the unemployed to search for a
job), the poverty trap (people on low incomes receiving benefits are discouraged to
make any additional work effort), and the high labour costs (discourage hiring). The
examination of net replacement rates aims to study the first failure, namely the
unemployment trap.
For the purpose of our analysis, the OECD studies are of particular interest (OECD
1997 and 1996b, Martin 1996). The most recent one for 1995 presents the
replacement rates for 18 OECD countries. All replacement rate calculations are based
on the level of previous earnings defined with reference to the Average Production
Worker (APW), taking as the two most significant cases the APW level of earnings
and two thirds of the APW level of earnings. The calculations are made for the most
common family types.
The scope, process and assumptions of the calculations are the following. The family
types are defined as single versus couple, and in the case of a couple, one versus two
earners and with children versus without children, with the standard assumption that
the benefit recipient is 40 years old and has been continuously employed and
contributing to the unemployment insurance fund since the age of 18; moreover, the
individual is assumed to receive the benefit for the length to which he/she is legally
entitled, implying that he/she satisfies the necessary requirements for entitlement.
Replacement rates have been calculated gross (before-tax) and net (after-tax);
different net replacement rates have been calculated according to the inclusion of
benefits other than unemployment benefits (housing benefits, child allowances, family
benefits, etc.). Different calculations have been made for the first month of17
unemployment and for the 60
th month of unemployment. Where in the case of the 60
th
month of unemployment the level of social assistance is higher than that of
unemployment benefit, and where the unemployed family would be entitled to have it,
social assistance is assumed to be paid on top of the primary benefit.
The calculations for 1994 and 1995 give the same overall picture. However, several
revisions have been made in calculation formulae, as well as more countries have
been included in the study. Thus, the 1995 calculations represent a more established
approach.
7DEOHD 2(&'1HWUHSODFHPHQWUDWHVIRUVLQJOHHDUQHUKRXVHKROGV
$3:OHYHORIHDUQLQJV
First month of unemployment 60th month of unemployment
(8FRXQWULHV Couple, no
children
Couple, 2
children
Couple, 2 children,
housing benefits
Couple, no
children
Couple, 2 children,
housing benefits
Belgium 64 66 66 42 70
Denmark 69 73 83 60 83
Finland 
1) 63 75 88 25 98
France 69 71 80 36 65
Germany 60 71 78 37 71
Ireland 49 64 64 37 64
Italy 37 47 47 0 11
Netherlands 77 77 84 0 80
Spain 75 75 74 0 46
Sweden 
1) 81 84 89 0 99
United Kingdom 35 51 77 25 77
/RZOHYHORIHDUQLQJVRIWKH$3:
First month of unemployment 60th month of unemployment
(8FRXQWULHV Couple, no
children
Couple, 2
children
Couple, 2 children,
housing benefits
Couple, no
children
Couple, 2 children,
housing benefits
Belgium 75 76 76 55 91
Denmark 92 93 95 86 95
Finland 
1) 67 83 89 37 100
France 79 81 88 54 83
Germany 60 70 77 39 80
Ireland 67 70 70 66 70
Italy 36 45 45 0 14
Netherlands 79 78 84 0 95
Spain 74 78 77 0 66
Sweden 
1) 82 85 89 0 121
United Kingdom 52 67 90 38 90
1)  Finland and Sweden joined the European Union in 1995.18
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$3:OHYHORIHDUQLQJV
First month of unemployment 60
th month of unemployment
(8FRXQWULHV Single Couple, no
children
Couple, 2
children
Single Couple, no
children
Couple, 2
children
Austria 57 60 71 54 60 69
Belgium 65 57 60 46 66 63
Denmark 65 68 77 49 77 97
Finland 68 71 87 62 82 100
France 76 74 79 43 43 51
Germany 70 66 80 62 63 73
Ireland 33 49 64 33 49 64
Italy 36 42 47 0 4 11
Luxembourg 86 86 90 54 66 77
Netherlands 75 81 82 60 76 78
Portugal 79 78 77 0 0 6
Spain 73 74 76 27 33 46
Sweden 75 75 85 62 83 100
United Kingdom 52 63 67 52 63 76
1RQ(8FRXQWULHV
Australia 37 50 72 37 50 72
Canada 61 63 68 27 44 59
Czech Republic 54 76 77 36 63 98
Hungary 67 67 74 47 47 59
Iceland 55 46 59 52 54 80
Japan 63 61 59 35 49 71
Korea 55 55 54 10 10 10
New Zealand 37 41 64 37 41 64
Norway 66 67 73 39 .. 68
Poland 34 36 42 30 29 35
Switzerland 77 77 88 52 64 68
United States 58 60 59 7 13 5119
7DEOHEFRQW /RZOHYHORIHDUQLQJV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First month of unemployment 60th month of unemployment
(8FRXQWULHV Single Couple, no
children
Couple, 2
children
Single Couple, no
children
Couple, 2
children
A u s t r i a 5 76 27 7 5 45 97 4
B e l g i u m 8 47 67 6 7 89 09 1
D e n m a r k 9 09 49 5 6 89 88 0
Finland 83 86 92 84 100 100
France 85 85 87 57 56 58
G e r m a n y 7 37 47 6 7 68 79 2
Ireland 45 64 72 45 64 72
Italy 35 42 46 0 6 14
Luxembourg 85 85 91 75 89 89
N e t h e r l a n d s 8 69 08 6 8 59 59 6
Portugal 89 88 87 0 0 8
S p a i n 7 17 17 3 3 74 76 3
Sweden 78 78 85 89 116 122
United Kingdom 75 88 80 75 88 91
1RQ(8FRXQWULHV
Australia 50 67 82 50 67 82
Canada 61 64 68 38 60 77
Czech Republic 60 74 76 53 91 100
Hungary 86 86 90 64 64 74
Iceland 73 66 81 69 78 109
J a p a n 7 26 96 7 5 17 18 7
K o r e a 5 45 45 3 1 51 51 5
N e w  Z e a l a n d 5 27 17 7 5 27 17 7
Norway 65 67 75 56 96 78
Poland 49 52 61 42 42 51
Switzerland 76 76 88 74 92 96
United States 59 59 50 11 18 58
The net replacement rates differ significantly among countries. However, some
common patterns can be identified:
·  Taxation and means-tested benefits mean that the net replacement rates are
invariably higher than gross replacement rates, with the difference being
particularly large when benefits are not taxed.
·  Where existing, housing benefits can change considerably the rates.
·  In all countries, except in Belgium and Portugal, net replacement rates are higher
for families with children than for those without children, often due to higher or
additional benefits paid to families with children. Similarly, earners with a
dependant spouse tend to have higher net replacement rates than single persons.
·  Net replacement rates for low-income families (at 2/3 APW earnings level) are
significantly higher in some countries (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland,20
Portugal, UK) and at about the same level in some other countries (Austria,
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain, Sweden) than for those at average earnings
level.
·  Net replacement rates for low-income families (single persons and couples without
children) are below 70 per cent only in Austria, Ireland and Italy in the EU, and for
the family type with children only in Italy.
·  After 60 months, unemployment benefits are lower than in the 1
st month of
unemployment in some countries (France, Spain) or not paid at all to families
without children (Italy, Portugal). In the majority of EU countries (10 out of 15),
the net replacement rate for a single person at average wage level is lower in the
60
th than the 1
st month of employment, but less so for low-wage earners and
families with children.
·  In many countries social assistance eligibility results in higher net replacement
rates than unemployment benefits, especially for families with children. In
Belgium, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom, the
net replacement rates including social assistance (60
th month of employment) are
higher for low-paid families with children than in the 1
st month of unemployment
(social assistance not included).
I.1.2 Seven Countries Group
The Danish and Dutch authorities co-ordinated a comparative study on unemployment
benefits and social assistance in seven European countries (the so-called Seven
Countries Study, including Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands,
Sweden and the United Kingdom).2 The study presents a standardised description of
tax and benefits rules, as well as standardised calculations of net replacement rates in
stylised cases of various family types and income levels. The national experts from
each participating country combined their efforts in order to agree upon a common
methodology and to carry out the necessary calculations by themselves in each
country. This was considered to ensure good international comparability and high
quality of data, together with in-depth understanding of national circumstances.
More specifically, the countries involved calculated the actual gross and net income
support which unemployment would provide in the contingency that one member of
the household falls unemployed.3 In some countries the social assistance forms a norm
of the social minimum and guarantees a subjective right to that level of income
maintenance. In the case where it gives a higher level of assistance than the
                                                          
2  Seven Countries Group (1995), “Unemployment Benefits and Social Assistance in seven European
Countries”, Werkdocumenten No. 10, Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, The
Netherlands
3 Replacement rates of social assistance, which represents the minimum out-of-work income, were
also calculated. The respective net replacement rate shows the level of social minimum relative to
the in-work disposable income at the chosen prevailing wage levels. The net replacement rates of
social assistance were compared with those of unemployment benefits.21
unemployment benefit, it is included as means-tested benefit in the calculation of net
replacement rate of unemployment benefit as well.  Complementary housing benefits
less housing costs and children allowances are taken into account when and where
applicable. The disposable income is defined as “Family purse” income indicating that
necessary housing costs are deducted. Respectively, the net replacement rates show
the economic living standard after the housing costs when unemployed relative to that
when working.
Gross and net replacement ratios have been calculated for eight family types (viz.,
single person, one-earner couple, two-earners couple, single parent with two children,
one-earner couple with two children, two-earners couple with two children, young
person living alone and young person living with parents) and for six income levels
ranging from half to double the wage level of the average production worker (that is,
0.5, 0.675, 0.75, 1, 1.5 and 2 APW level). This income range can be estimated to
cover the essential wage dispersion. For instance, in Finland and Sweden, where
distribution data were available, over 90 per cent of full-time wage earners were
within these limits. The calculations of benefits and disposable income are based on
information of the unemployment, other benefit and tax schemes in 1994.
7DEOH 6HYHQ&RXQWULHV*URXS
1HWUHSODFHPHQWUDWHVIRURQHHDUQHUKRXVHKROGV
$3:OHYHORIHDUQLQJV
Single One-earner couple
No children 2 children 2 children, incl.
child care costs 
1)
No children 2 children
D e n m a r k 5 87 9 8 8 6 16 5
F i n l a n d 5 38 6 9 0 7 59 6
France 64 68 - 65 79
Germany 44 64 - 46 71
Netherlands 65 67 70 66 69
Sweden 71 87 93 68 83
United Kingdom 21 44 - 34 58
/RZOHYHORIHDUQLQJVRI$3:
Single One-earner couple
No children 2 children 2 children, incl.
child care costs 
1)
No children 2 children
D e n m a r k 8 59 5 9 7 8 88 9
Finland 64 89 89 100 100
France 80 82 - 78 89
Germany 45 89 - 73 95
Netherlands 60 78 84 86 88
Sweden 70 86 91 64 80
United Kingdom 34 65 - 54 8622
7DEOHFRQW +LJKOHYHORIHDUQLQJVRI$3:
Single One-earner couple
No children 2 children 2 children, including
child care costs 
1)
No children 2 children
D e n m a r k 2 95 2 5 3 3 24 0
F i n l a n d 4 16 2 6 5 3 86 3
France 64 60 - 62 69
Germany 44 49 - 43 51
Netherlands 49 51 54 51 54
Sweden 36 57 61 32 50
United Kingdom 10 21 - 16 27
1)  The children are assumed to be 3 and 8 years old, full day care is provided for the youngest child.
The main conclusions of these calculations are:
·  Replacement rates for unemployed vary considerably between countries, family
types and income levels, HJ for a single person at average wage level from 21 per
cent in the United Kingdom to 71 per cent in Sweden.
·  In all countries, replacement rates in many cases are above 80 per cent or even
exceeding 100 per cent in the lower end of the income scale, which might influence
work incentives.
·  In most countries, having a dependant spouse does not change substantially the net
replacement rates, the only exceptions being Finland and the United Kingdom
where the differences reach more than ten percentage points, and in Germany for
low-income households  where the difference reach almost 30 percentage points.
·  In all countries, benefits for unemployed favour families with children, thus giving
them higher replacement rates. The most striking differences are seen in Germany,
Finland and the United Kingdom; couples with children have higher replacement
rates than single parents except in Denmark and Sweden.
·  Families that are exempted from day care costs when unemployed can even be
better off receiving benefits rather than working, which indicates severe damage to
work incentives.
·  In some countries families with children have very high reservation wages.
Families need an income close to or above the level of the average production
worker in order to be better off than when receiving benefits.23
I.1.3 Central Planning Bureau
The Central Planning Bureau of The Hague developed for the Commission services a
tax-benefit model enabling the estimation of, on one side, the social contribution and
taxes payable by individuals at different levels of gross earnings, and on the other
side, the unemployment benefit or social assistance receivable by the same individual
in case of unemployment. Through the calculation of replacement rates, the study
allows an overview to be obtained of the income position of unemployed workers for
the EU Member States and three states of the US with reference at the 1 July 1993.4
The replacement rate is defined as disposable income when in work relative to
disposable income when unemployed, including housing benefits (costs such as
housing costs, the cost for childcare, travel to and from work or working expenses are
not considered). As to the numerator of the ratio, benefits from unemployment
insurance for employees in the private sector, unemployment assistance and general
needfulness are considered. As to the denominator, earnings of blue-collar workers are
considered. The average gross wage of a manual worker in industry, as estimated by
the OECD, has been taken as the benchmark against which to compare replacement
rates in different Member States and to assess the way that these change as earnings
and family circumstances vary.
Replacement rates have been calculated for three kinds of households: single persons,
married couples without children and married couples with children; in the case of
married couples, it is assumed that only one spouse is in employment. As in the
OECD study, the person is assumed to be 40 years old, but with only ten years of
work record (as against 22 in OECD). Different replacement rates are also calculated
according to the duration of unemployment (at various stages of unemployment, from
the initial situation to that which occurred after 60 months of unemployment).
The results are presented in Table 3 at the minimum wage level and at the APW one,
in each case for three stylised types of single-earner households and for the 1
st and 60
th
month of unemployment.
                                                          
4  Central Planning Bureau (1995), Replacement Rates – A Transatlantic View, CPB Working Paper,
No 80, The Netherlands24
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$:3HDUQLQJVOHYHO
First month of unemployment 60th month of unemployment
Single Couple, no
children
Couple, 2
children
Single Couple, no
children
Couple, 2
children
Belgium 67 59 63 47 59 66
Denmark 80 88 87 80 82 87
France 80 78 80 47 56 65
Germany 61 63 74 55 59 69
Greece 48 50 55 7 8 10
Ireland 44 59 74 44 59 74
Italy 56 62 66 28 44 63
Luxembourg 85 84 89 45 62 77
Netherlands 74 79 82 57 73 77
Portugal 79 77 76 0 0 5
Spain 84 79 77 23 29 41
United Kingdom 41 54 70 41 52 70
0LQLPXPZDJHOHYHO
First month of unemployment 60th month of unemployment
Single Couple, no
children
Couple, 2
children
Single Couple, no
children
Couple, 2
children
Belgium 77 81 81 65 81 85
Denmark 95 96 97 95 96 97
France 89 89 90 63 78 88
Germany 79 97 112 79 97 112
Greece 79 79 89 12 12 16
Ireland 73 93 115 73 93 115
Italy 79 83 87 43 63 87
Luxembourg 89 103 102 79 90 92
Netherlands 85 100 10 85 100 100
Portugal 112 112 111 0 0 10
Spain 107 107 106 47 61 81
United Kingdom 80 89 86 79 86 86
The main conclusions of these calculations are:
·  Generally, at the minimum wage level, income loss was minimal in the case of
becoming unemployed, because of the minimum assistance levels set. In two
countries (Portugal and Spain) there was no income loss for any family type, or in
many other countries (Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands) for families
with children in the first month of unemployment. In the majority (7 out of 12) of25
the European countries examined, the average income loss was less than 10 per
cent, and over 20 per cent only for single person households in some countries.
·  After 5 years of unemployment, in a good half of the countries considered, the net
income dropped substantially for single persons but only in Greece, Portugal and
Spain for families with children. The remaining countries preserved about the same
income level.
·  In general, having a dependent spouse does not change the amount of gross wage
or unemployment benefit; however, often special tax advantages and higher
housing benefits are available for sole earners; in addition, the amount of general
needfulness is often higher for these households.
·  For couples with children replacement rates are even higher; tax advantages, child
benefits, additional assistance, etc. lead to higher disposable incomes; especially
low income profit by these instruments.
, &RPSDULVRQEHWZHHQQHWUHSODFHPHQWUDWHVIRUVW\OLVHGKRXVHKROGV
The net replacement calculations for stylised households use similar approaches and
are methodologically comparable. However, there are differences in detailed
assumptions and the years considered are not exactly the same. Both of these factors
are likely to induce slightly different results, but one can assume that the overall
picture should be similar. The most essential differences between these calculations
concern the treatment of housing costs and benefits, the possible topping-up of social
assistance, and the selection of the low-wage level.
The OECD and CPB studies apply the general disposable income concept, LH.,
including housing benefits but without deducting housing costs, whereas the Seven
Countries Group applies a wider disposable income definition, LH., so-called “family
purse” income which is measured including housing benefits and deducting moderate
housing costs. Here, the assumption of “moderate” housing costs, which were slightly
different between countries, additionally affects the final outcome5.  The OECD and
CPB studies assume that social assistance is not granted during the first month of
unemployment and the possible topping-up of social assistance is included only in the
calculations of the net replacement rates for the 60
th month of unemployment, whereas
the Seven Countries Group includes also social assistance in the net replacement rate
for the first month’s unemployment. The low-wage level is interpreted as two thirds of
the average wage level in the OECD and Seven Countries Group studies, whereas as
the minimum wage in the CPB study.
                                                          
5  See Eight Countries Group (1997), “Note on methodology: The Importance of Housing Cost
Assumption” in the report “Income Benefits for Early Exit from the Labour Market in eight
European Countries”, Werkdocumenten No. 61, Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en
Werkgelegenheid, The Netherlands26
There are significant variations in the replacement rates of different family types in all
countries, implying that one could weight them differently to compute an alternative
summary measure. For instance, instead of taking a simple average of all the
replacement rates, an alternative approach would be to weight them in line with the
actual demographic, family and duration composition of unemployment in each
country. However, using population weights also implies problems, namely, that the
population sizes respond to incentives in benefit systems and thus potentially give rise
to bias in the summary measure. Here, for comparison of different stylised
calculations, a simple average of the first month’s replacement rates for three different
family types (single person, couple without children, couple with two children) has
been opted for.6
7DEOH 6XPPDU\PHDVXUHRIQHWUHSODFHPHQWUDWHVLQWKHILUVWPRQWK
2IXQHPSOR\PHQW
APW wage level Low wage level
(8FRXQWULHV OECD
 1995
CPB
1993
Seven Countries
1994
OECD
 1995
CPB
1993
Seven Countries
  1994
Austria 63 .. .. 65 .. ..
Belgium 61 63 .. 79 80 ..
Denmark 70 85 61 93 96 87
Finland 75 .. 75 87 .. 88
France 76 79 69 86 89 82
Germany 72 66 54 74 96 71
Greece .. 51 .. .. 82 ..
Ireland 49 59 .. 60 94 ..
Italy 42 61 .. 41 83 ..
Luxembourg 87 86 .. 87 98 ..
Netherlands 79 78 67 87 95 78
Portugal 78 77 .. 88 112 ..
Spain 74 80 .. 72 107 ..
Sweden 78 .. 74 80 .. 71
United Kingdom 61 55 38 81 85 58
Note: The summary measure of net replacement rates has been calculated as a simple average of the net
replacement rates for three family types (single earner, couple without children and couple with two
children).
Low wage level is the minimum wage in CPB study and in others two thirds of APW wage level.
In summary, the different calculations of net replacement rates of unemployment
benefits lead to broadly similar conclusions. While there are more differences between
the levels of various calculations, the country rankings are strongly correlated. The
comparison of figures allows the distinction to be made between groups of countries
with - arbitrarily defined - high, intermediate and low replacement rates. The high
                                                          
6  There are significant differences in the weights of different household types across countries, thus
implicating also differences in family patterns. For instance, the share of single person households
varied between 20-50 per cent, couples without children between 20-30, and couples with children
between 20-50 per cent in European countries (OECD 1997b).27
replacement rates are noticed in Luxembourg, Netherlands, Denmark, Finland,
Sweden, France and Portugal. Intermediate replacement rates are found in Austria,
Belgium, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom and the low replacement rates in
Greece, Ireland and Italy.
A more detailed comparison between OECD and CPB figures shows that the net
replacement rates tended to be higher in CPB than in OECD calculations, with the
exceptions of Germany and United Kingdom and with a number of exceptions for the
family type of a couple with two children.
The calculation of net replacement rates at minimum wage level (CPB) provides
additional information, because it is a stricter condition than a low wage level in the
OECD calculation. In many countries, the net replacement rates at minimum wage
level, especially for families, exceeded the income from minimum wage; in Portugal
and Spain, also a single person was better off on benefits than on minimum wage. The
results concerning net replacement rates at the minimum wage level should be
interpreted with regards to the minimum wage level relative to average wage level,
which differ markedly between countries.7  Notably in Portugal, Spain, Ireland and
Italy, the net replacement rates were far above those for two thirds of APW wage level
calculated by OECD.
The replacement rates by Seven Countries Group were, in general, clearly lower than
those in the OECD calculations, mainly due to the fact that moderate housing costs
were deducted from the disposable income of households. For families with children,
especially in Finland, Germany and the UK, the rates were, however, higher, due to
the topping-up of social assistance having been taken into account. In general, the
ranking order of countries according to replacement rates was largely the same in
these two studies.
                                                          
7  According to OECD Study, the minimum wages relative to the full-time mean earnings in 1997
ranged from about 30 per cent (in Spain) to 55 per cent (in France) in a group of EU countries. See
“Making the Most of the Minimum: Statutory Minimum Wages, Employment and Poverty”, in
OECD Employment Outlook 199828
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The above studies were based on stylised household calculations looking at
entitlements. Here, further on, empirical approaches to calculate net replacement rates
on the basis of empirical data are applied. It should be stressed that although the
methodologies are completely different, the aim is to capture the same phenomena,
namely the comparison of living standards when employed and unemployed.
Usually, when economic conditions in two different labour market situations are
studied, the aim is to compare the same person when he/she is employed and
unemployed. When the comparison is made for stylised households, it is expected that
people use every opportunity that the tax and benefit systems offer. Hence, the
calculations describe which mechanisms are built in the tax and benefit schemes and
how they are designed to work. Empirical studies have the advantage that the data
have statistical relevance and tell us to which extent people use the opportunities of
benefit schemes, and thus, they provide a picture of the economic living standard
when people are either employed or unemployed. However, if the data are not
longitudinal, they often fail to follow the same person in different labour market
situations and, instead, one has to compare two different groups in different labour
market situations.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to compare the results from empirical and simulation
studies. Primarily, one would like to know whether the tax and benefit systems work
as they are designed to. Second, even though one can assume that the results cannot
give the same figures in detail, one is interested to know whether they give the same
overall picture of differences between countries.
One question which often arises is whether the calculations of net replacement rates
for stylised households are representative of real life situations. By definition, they
present results for certain family types with given income levels and thereby illustrate
the functioning of tax and benefit systems in a simplified manner. A more complete
set of calculations for different family types and income levels can illustrate the
variation, but it is not easy to sum them up into one “average” figure which would
give an overall picture of the systems. Moreover, people might not always be entitled
to benefits or do not take up all benefits as easily as it is assumed in simulation
calculations. Furthermore, the multiplicity of family and labour market situations
makes it difficult to capture all features in stylised calculations. For instance, part-time
work, short employment spells and additional costs related to work may draw too little
attention in stylised calculations. Some assumptions like full exploitation of tax-
benefit systems are likely to over-estimate the net replacement rates, whereas some
others like disregard of short unemployment spells and part-time work tend to under-
estimate them. All in all, the picture may be regarded as being too simplified.29
Therefore, the empirical studies complement the picture of net replacement rates. First
of all, they can better capture the variety of family and labour market situations.
Moreover, assuming that the data is complete, they can produce useful information on
take-up rates of benefits in situations where people should be eligible to receive
benefits. Simultaneously, however, comparison difficulties also arise. The comparable
groups are different and it is not easy to take control over the differences in the groups
compared.
The following chapter reports on a study carried out by the services of DG II. It is
based on the European Community Household Panel data and aims to find out
whether the net replacement rates calculated for stylised households correspond to the
economic living standard of the unemployed in relation to that of the employed in
actual life. In this study the investigated populations are the whole actual population
of the unemployed and that of the employed during one reference year.
Another analysis based on the ECHP data carried out by the DG V services with
similar aims but different populations is briefly referred to in the next chapter. This
study is confined to the population which was both unemployed and employed during
the reference year. The living standard during unemployment months is compared
with that during employment.
Furthermore, reference is made to a Swedish simulation experiment applied to a large
sample population. It provides a further methodological step in attempts to calculate
actual net replacement rates for actual individuals in empirical data. This approach
succeeds in avoiding distortive effects of hypothetical calculations of replacement
rates for over-simplified household types. Simultaneously, it produces a far better
picture, both of the average measure of the rates and their effective distribution, and
thereby better captures the real incidence of the “unemployment trap” problem.
Moreover, this study offers an interesting reference of how simulation results matched
with those of statistical comparisons.
,, $6WXG\EDVHGRQWKH(XURSHDQ&RPPXQLW\+RXVHKROG3DQHO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II.2.1 The methodology
II.2.1.1. Data
The basis of this analysis is the rich microeconomic data collected in the European
Community Household Panel (ECHP), designed by EUROSTAT in close consultation
with member states8. The first wave (1993) of the panel survey provides information
                                                          
8  See  ECHP documentation, e.g. European Commission (1996), “ECHP Wave 1 documentation,”
Doc. Pan 15.2.1996, EUROSTAT, and “The European Community Household Panel (ECHP):
Survey Methodology and Implementation, Volume 1”, EUROSTAT30
on the social dimension of 12 member countries in the European Union. The ECHP is
a multi-dimensional and multi-purpose survey, which covers income, demographic
and labour force characteristics, health, education, housing, migration and other
topics.
ECHP is a panel survey and, in the future, this design allows one to follow the same
individuals over time: in this way, it will be possible to have longitudinal analysis in
aiming at identifying people’s experiences due to changes in socio-economic
conditions and policies and studying their reactions to these changes. For this purpose,
the survey is intended to be updated every year with a different ZDYH However, due to
data availability during this study, the following tables and analysis are based only on
the results of the first wave, which has a sample size of 61,106 households (with
around 127,000 individuals over 15 years of age) for the 12 EU member states. Thus,
this analysis is not expected to overcome the usual disadvantages of cross-sectional
data: as the beginning or the end of unemployment spells for a major fraction of
unemployed is not observed, the data only provides information on the unemployment
spell during the reference year, and the probability of finding a job depends on the
state of the business cycle, which cannot be controlled.
II.2.1.2. Definitions of target populations and observation units
7DUJHWSRSXODWLRQVThe analysis will focus on the active population, i.e., people in
households of working age. First, a population of individuals belonging to households
whose head is of active age (below 65 years) and whose members are available for
labour market is defined. Second, a sub-population of individuals belonging to low-
income households is formed.  This is an interesting group, because unemployment in
a low-income household is a greater welfare risk than unemployment in a higher-
income household: the living standard during unemployment is low, but at the same
time, economic incentives to take up a job, especially a low-paid or part-time job, can
be low. This is due to social benefits, which are widespread among the lowest income
groups of population, and which can easily exceed the earnings of part-time work or
which often are withdrawn if the benefit recipient has his/her own earnings. The target
populations are defined as follows.
·  $OOKRXVHKROGV All households whose head is of working age, i.e., under 65 years
and whose members are at the disposal of labour markets. This means that
households whose largest source of income is any kind of pension (old-age,
survivor or invalidity)  or income from investment, savings or property are
excluded.
·  /RZLQFRPH KRXVHKROGV Sub-group of the above defined active households
whose disposable income is less than two thirds of the average household
disposable income.31
2EVHUYDWLRQXQLWV±Thekey observation unit in this analysis will be the individual,
whether employed or unemployed. However, in order to simplify the analysis and to
compare the regular income in- and out-of-work, only dependant workers are taken
into account. The self-employed and unpaid workers in family enterprises are not
taken into consideration, because their income includes irregularities and elements
other than compensation of work. Also the apprentices and trainees are excluded
because their labour market status is not yet established.
In order to form the relevant sub-groups for analysis purposes, the target groups are
formed from the employed or unemployed individuals in the above defined target
households. Thus, this analysis requires ‘matching’ data of both the household and the
individual files.
The groups in relation to which the main variables are analysed are the following:
· (PSOR\HGLQDOODFWLYHKRXVHKROGV: all individuals over 15 years who receive an
income from paid work.
· 8QHPSOR\HG LQ DOO DFWLYH KRXVHKROGV: all individuals over 15 years who are
unemployed, at the time of the interview according to the declaration of the
interviewed person.
· (PSOR\HGLQORZLQFRPHDFWLYHKRXVHKROGV: all individuals over 15 years who
receive an income from paid work and belong to the low-income households (i.e.
households where disposable income is less than two thirds of the average
household disposable income).
· 8QHPSOR\HG LQ ORZLQFRPH DFWLYH KRXVHKROGV: all individuals over 15 years
who are unemployed and belong to the low-income households.
II.2.1.3. In- and out-of-work income
The comparison is made between employed and unemployed individuals with the
same characteristics, assuming that the income that an individual who loses his/her
job would receive is the same as that received by an unemployed person with the same
characteristics (level of household income, sex, age, education, sector of last
occupation, etc.).
For the purpose of this analysis the concept of individual net income is defined. It
takes into consideration regular income from dependent work (when it is the case)
plus all typical benefits that the individual receives. Irregular income from dependent
work, income from self-employment, pensions (old-age/retirement, survivors' and
invalidity), income from investment, savings or property, or any kind of gift, are not
taken into account when calculating the individual income. Family allowances and
housing allowances, which in the questionnaire were attributed to the household, were
redistributed in each household among all active (i.e., employed or unemployed)
individuals. All earnings and benefit amounts are indicated net of possible tax and
other deductions already in the questionnaire. This means that if  there has been yearly32
adjustments in the taxation at the end of the year, these changes have not been taken
into account.
The benefits that we analyse are:
· 8QHPSOR\PHQWUHODWHG EHQHILWV unemployment insurance benefits,
unemployment assistance, training/retraining allowance, placement, resettlement
and rehabilitation benefits, other benefits related to unemployment, job creation or
training;
· )DPLO\UHODWHG EHQHILWV child allowance (normally given to the mother),
allowance for care of invalid dependants, maternity allowance, birth allowance,
unmarried mother’s allowance, other family-related benefits;
· 6LFNQHVVUHODWHGEHQHILWV income maintenance benefits in case of sickness or
injury, other sickness benefits, compensation for occupational accidents and
diseases, invalidity benefits;
· (GXFDWLRQUHODWHGEHQHILWV scholarships and study grants, other;
· +RXVLQJUHODWHGEHQHILWV housing allowances or subsidies (as they are reported
per household, the total amount given to each household is distributed to all active
individuals taken into account in our analysis);
· /DVWUHVRUW VRFLDO EHQHILWV social assistance payments or non-cash assistance
from the welfare office (as for housing allowances, the total amount given to each
household is distributed to all active individuals).
Unemployment-related benefits are of greatest importance for the purposes of this
study. Unemployment benefits￿ are usually distinguished between insurance and
assistance benefits. In order to become eligible for benefits, the status of
unemployment is not always sufficient: in the case of unemployment insurance, there
are usually contribution requirements and in the case of unemployment assistance, in
most member states there is some income testing.
$QXQHPSOR\PHQWLQVXUDQFH EHQHILWscheme is an arrangement by which a person is
guaranteed some income on becoming unemployed in exchange for making payments
into the scheme. The purpose of Unemployment Insurance is to provide a certain
degree of income security in the event of unemployment. If the system works
efficiently, it also promotes labour market efficiency by enabling a potential worker to
spend a sufficient time searching for a job which matches his skill level (having the
right people in the right jobs raises productivity and reduces the chance of them
becoming unemployed in the future).
In many  European countries, a system of a last-resort XQHPSOR\PHQWDVVLVWDQFH has
been considered necessary to fill the gaps due to failure to receive an insurance-based
benefit. It usually grants  minimum level benefits to workers who have exhausted
unemployment insurance benefits or who do not qualify for receiving them. Where
                                                          
9 For a detailed description of the features of unemployment benefit systems, see European
Commission (1995).33
means-testing is applied, it is most often granted to bread-winners with dependants. It
is clearly an income redistribution system of equity considerations between the
employed and those out of work, whereas the unemployment insurance system rather
redistributes income inter-temporally between employment and unemployment
periods.
II.2.1.4. Comparison of disposable income between the unemployed and employed
The results of this study rely on the concept of net replacement rate. Here it differs
from the usual definition and is used to mean a statistical equivalent for the usual
concept. It is represented by the ratio of out-of-work individual net income
(disposable income) to in-work individual net income, with the out-of-work income
being the total net amount of income that the unemployed receive and the in-work
income being the total net amount of income that the employed receive.
For the reasons explained above, this study does not try to assess what would be the
in-work income of an unemployed individual in case he/she left unemployment and,
hence, the properly defined net replacement rates are not calculated. Instead, we
assume that the income that an unemployed individual would receive if he/she found a
job is equal to the average income of an employed individual represented in the
sample data. In order to compare the above defined net replacement rates, we divide
the actual average out-of-work income of the unemployed by the average income of
employees.
,,0DLQUHVXOWVRIWKHDQDO\VLV
The results are presented in three sections:
·  Section II.2.2.1 displays structural characteristics of target populations and groups.
It shows the number and the incidence of unemployment as well as the take-up
rates of unemployment benefits in all and low-income households.
·  In Section II.2.2.2 average net replacement rates are presented for several subsets
of the total population of unemployed individuals and they are calculated as the
ratios of the average out-of-work income of a group of unemployed individuals
with specific characteristics to the average in-work income of the group of
employees with the same characteristics as the group of unemployed. The share of
unemployed reaching certain levels of net replacement rates is then represented as
the share of that specific subset to the total number of unemployed.
·  Section II.2.2.3 describes the variation of the level of the out-of-work income
relative to the average in-work income. The shares of the unemployed reaching
high, moderate and low net replacement rate levels are presented. Net replacement
rates over 70 per cent are regarded as high, those between 50 and 70 per cent as
moderate and those less than 50 per cent as low.34
II.2.2.1. Structural characteristics
,QFLGHQFH RI XQHPSOR\PHQW ± Combining the results of the ECHP on the
unemployed and employed in the member States populations, it was possible to
calculate the incidence of the unemployment. This is defined as a percentage of the
unemployed in the labour force, where, for the reasons explained above, the labour
force is defined as the sum of the unemployed and the employed in dependant work.
The results are presented in Table 5, together with similar statistics from the Labour
Force Survey, in order to allow for comparisons. Table 6 presents similar results for
low-income households only.
7DEOH 1XPEHUVRIWKHXQHPSOR\HGDQGWKHXQHPSOR\PHQWUDWHV
$FFRUGLQJWR(&+3DQG/DERXU)RUFHVXUYH\VLQ
$OOKRXVHKROGV
(&+3VXUYH\ /DERXU)RUFHVXUYH\
Number of the Incidence of Number of the Unemployment
Unemployed unemployment, % Unemployed Rate, %
in 1000 of the labour force 
1) in 1000 of the labour force
Belgium 540 14 329   8,1
Denmark 343 13 305 10,9
France 3113 15 2788 11,4
Germany 3081 9 2975   7,7
Greece 617 23 347   8,8
Ireland 248 22 208 15,9
Italy 3874 21 2300 10,4
Luxembourg 7 5 4   2,3
Netherlands 916 16 386   6,3
Portugal 438 12 240   5,5
Spain 3006 25 3388 22,4
United Kingdom 2481 11 2919 10,4
EU 12 18663 15 16188 10,7
1) The labour force is here defined as sum of the unemployed and the employed in dependent work.
According to the ECHP survey, there were 18.7 million unemployed people in 12
Member States in 1993. This figure is 15 per cent higher than the unemployment
figure in Labour Force Surveys (16.2 million). Notably in Greece, Italy, the
Netherlands and Portugal the differences were unexpectedly large: the ECHP showed
approximately double the unemployment figures.  The differences are due to different
sources, sample bias and definitions. The ECHP survey accounts the number of
unemployed at the time of interview according to the declarations of the persons
interviewed, whereas the Labour Force Survey investigates unemployment at several
fixed points of time in the course of the year and defines unemployment on the basis35
of job search and labour market availability. Hence, one can assume that declaring
oneself as unemployed in an interview like ECHP does not follow such strict rules, for
instance concerning the availability of labour markets, as the Labour Force Survey.
The incidence of unemployment, LHthe unemployed as a share of the sum of the
employed in dependant work and the unemployed, was 15 % on average in 12
Member States whereas the unemployment rate according to the Labour Force
Surveys was 10.7 %.
7DEOH 6KDUHRILQGLYLGXDOVQXPEHUDQGVKDUHRIWKHXQHPSOR\HG
$QGWKHLQFLGHQFHRIXQHPSOR\PHQWLQ
/RZLQFRPHKRXVHKROGV
Share of individuals Number of the Share of all Incidence of
in low-income unemployed unemployed unemployment, %
households in 1000 of the labour force 
1)
Belgium 28 273 51 39
Denmark 22 128 37 52
France 33 1704 55 34
Germany 24 1803 59 30
Greece 33 300 49 53
Ireland 33 151 61 57
Italy 34 2342 60 43
Luxembourg 28 4 61 12
Netherlands 30 436 48 36
Portugal 40 247 56 23
Spain 34 1753 58 52
United Kingdom 38 1873 76 33
EU 12 32 11014 59 37
1) The labour force is here defined as sum of the unemployed and the employed in dependent work in
the sub-population of low-income households.
Low-income households were defined as households having less than two thirds of the
average household income. Denmark and Germany had the smallest shares of
individuals in low-income households, 22 and 24 per cent respectively, and the United
Kingdom and Portugal the largest shares, 38  and 40 per cent, respectively. The rest of
the countries had a relatively similar figure of around 30 per cent of all individuals.
The small share of individuals in low-income households reflects a compressed
income distribution. The general picture of the shares of the individuals in low-
income households follows in great lines the general perception on overall income
differences across countries. Countries with the most equal income distribution had
the lowest shares of individuals in low-income households, and vice versa.
The share of unemployed people in low-income households was 59 per cent on
average, almost twofold the share of all individuals. In most countries the shares of
the unemployed were within the range of 48-61 per cent. Again Denmark with the
lowest (37 per cent) and the United Kingdom with the highest figure (76 per cent)36
clearly differed from the other countries studied. The greatest concentration due to
unemployment in low-income households, measured by the difference (38 percentage
points) between shares of the unemployed and all individuals, was found in the United
Kingdom, followed by Germany and Luxembourg. But surprisingly, Greece showed
the smallest concentration due to unemployment in low-income households. The share
of the unemployed was only 16 percentage points higher than that of all individuals.
The findings can be interpreted to give support to the perception of coincidence of
unemployment and low-income. These results suggest that the unemployment in the
United Kingdom is clearly a high risk for low income whereas it is not so in Denmark.
The Greek result can reflect that there are also other reasons than unemployment
which can lead to a low income situation.
7DNHXSUDWHV - In order to analyse incentive impacts of the benefit system, it is
important to know the take-up rates of benefits, LH how many persons who fulfil the
benefit eligibility actually take up the benefit.  One is interested to know whether the
recipiency of benefits can be taken for granted or whether only a part of those
fulfilling the primary eligibility condition in fact receive the benefits as well as
whether there are large differences across countries.
7DEOH 1XPEHUVDQGWDNHXSUDWHVRIDOOEHQHILWVDQG
8QHPSOR\PHQWEHQHILWV
$$OOKRXVHKROGV
Recipients of all benefits Unemployment benefits
Number Take-up rate, Number Take-up rate,
in 1000 % of all
unemployed
in 1000 % of all
 unemployed
Belgium 498 92 446 83
Denmark 337 98 273 80
France 2707 87 1218 39
Germany 2974 97 1846 60
Greece 267 43 70 11
Ireland 227 92 189 76
Italy 830 21 148 4
Luxembourg 5 78 1 8
The Netherlands 445 49 264 29
Portugal 300 69 110 25
Spain 1874 62 1028 34
United Kingdom 2183 88 502 20
EU 12 12647 68 6095 3337
7DEOHFRQW
%/RZLQFRPHKRXVHKROGV
Recipients of all benefits Unemployment benefits
Number Take-up rate, Number Take-up rate,
in 1000 % of all
unemployed
in 1000 % of all
unemployed
Belgium 257 94 228 83
Denmark 125 98 109 85
France 1466 86 637 37
Germany 1735 96 1084 60
Greece 133 44 25 8
Ireland 138 91 120 80
Italy 437 19 80 3
Luxembourg 3 81 1 13
The Netherlands 212 49 128 29
Portugal 165 67 53 22
Spain 1093 62 596 34
United Kingdom 1691 90 379 20
EU 12 7454 68 3439 31
According to the household panel survey, the average take-up rate of unemployment
benefits was 33 per cent amongst all unemployed and at about the same level amongst
the unemployed in low-income households. Three countries had high take-up rates of
unemployment benefits, namely Belgium (83 per cent for both all and low-income
unemployed), Denmark (80 per cent for all and 85 per cent for low-income
unemployed), and Ireland (76 and 80 per cent). After these countries, only in Germany
did a relatively large number of unemployed receive unemployment benefits (60 per
cent). In the rest of the countries the take-up rate did not exceed 40 percent. The
figures of some countries, notably Greece, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands
shall, however, be interpreted with great caution because the numbers of unemployed
were completely different from those in the Labour Force Surveys.
In summary, the figures indicate that the recipiency of unemployment benefits in case
of unemployment cannot be taken for granted in all countries. There seem to be
strikingly large differences in the take-up rates of unemployment benefits across
countries but there does not seem to be major differences in the take-up rates between
the low-income and all unemployed within any country.
There may be several explanations for these figures, some of them probably proving
that the take-up rates are low but it cannot be excluded, either, that some figures
simply are too low because the survey has failed to gather proper information on all
benefits or to define unemployment in a correct manner. Moreover, there are evident
reasons why the take-up rates are below 100 per cent. In most countries, the
unemployment benefit scheme is an insurance scheme requiring contributions from
the beneficiary. In the absence of contributions, the person is not entitled to benefits.
The second reason is that, in general, the insurance scheme requires at least some time
of work history. If one becomes unemployed immediately after vocational or other38
education, one would not be entitled to benefits. In some countries such persons are
covered by basic unemployment assistance schemes, but in some other countries they
have to apply for social assistance. Third, in most countries the benefit periods are
limited. The unemployed stays without benefit when the period expires. Fourth, in
some countries there are restrictions or means-testing to grant unemployment benefits
to the second bread-winner or other family members than the principal bread-winner.
Fifth, the countries can differ from each other in providing substituting schemes. For
instance, Italy has several schemes (Mobility Benefit, Wage Supplementary schemes
for laid-off people) which can work as substitutes for unemployment benefits and,
hence, can partly be the cause of the low take-up of unemployment benefits (Martin
1996).
II.2.2.2. Net replacement rates
Net replacement rates have been calculated as the ratio of the average individual
income of the unemployed (out-of-work income) to the average individual income of
the employed (in-work income). Table 8 presents average results for the whole target
population, Table 9 according to the educational level and Table 10 according to sex
and age; in each case the rates are reported for both the groups of all households and
low-income households.
7DEOH 1HWUHSODFHPHQWUDWHV55RIXQHPSOR\HGLQGLYLGXDOV
All households Low-income households 
1)
Belgium 47 59
Denmark 74 87
France 49 53
Germany 55 72
Greece 46 56
Ireland 51 76
Italy 45 42
Luxembourg 38 49
Netherlands 49 53
Portugal 54 68
Spain 44 61
United Kingdom 56 70
EU 12 
2) 52 64
1) The net replacement rates have been calculated within the respective comparison group, LH the out-
of-work income of the unemployed in low-income households is compared with the in-work income of
the employed in low-income households.
2) Weighted by the number of unemployed receiving benefits.
The average net replacement rate (weighted by the number of unemployed receiving
benefits) was 52 per cent in the EU countries. In six countries the rates were
somewhat below 50 per cent (44 to 49 per cent in Spain, Italy, Greece, Belgium,39
France and the Netherlands), in four other countries somewhat above 50 per cent (51
in Ireland, 54 in Portugal, 55 in Germany and 56 per cent in the United Kingdom).
Luxembourg had the lowest rate (38 per cent) and Denmark was far above the other
countries (74 per cent).
The net replacement rate for the subset of unemployed belonging to low-income
households was 64 per cent on average, 12 percentage points higher than that for all
unemployed. High rates were found in Denmark (87 per cent), Ireland (76), Germany
(72) and United Kingdom (70). The highest increases for low-income unemployed in
comparison with the rate for all unemployed were noted in Ireland (by 25 percentage
points), and in Germany and Spain (by 17 percentage points). Only in France and Italy
were the net replacement rates at about the same level as those for all unemployed and
Italy was the only country where the rate was clearly low (42 per cent).
In fact, in most European countries, the average out-of-work income for the
unemployed in low-income households was in absolute terms almost the same as that
on average for all unemployed. The unemployed in low-income households received
only 10 per cent less than all unemployed, whereas the employed in low-income
households received on average 25 per cent less than all employed.
7DEOH 1HWUHSODFHPHQWUDWHVDFFRUGLQJWROHYHORIHGXFDWLRQ
$$OOKRXVHKROGV
$OO (GXFDWLRQDOOHYHO
Unemployed Average Share of the unemployed 
1) Net replacement rates 
2)
in 1000 RR Low Medium High Low Medium High
Belgium 540 47 59 24 11 49 49 51
Denmark 343 74 68 16 15 79 75 63
France 3113 49 70 14 12 57 43 36
Germany 3081 55 86 7 6 60 60 45
Greece 617 46 45 40 15 54 44 40
Ireland 248 51 76 18 5 58 51 31
Italy 3874 45 62 29 5 47 39 52
Luxembourg 7 38 87 3 11 41 n.a. 66
Netherlands 916 49 34 54 12 50 54 54
Portugal 438 54 91 7 1 65 41 33
Spain 3006 44 78 11 12 50 45 33
UK 2481 56 77 16 7 61 58 49
EU 12 18663 52 71 19 9 57 50 4240
7DEOHFRQW
%/RZLQFRPHKRXVHKROGV
$OO (GXFDWLRQDOOHYHO
Unemployed Average Share of the unemployed 
1) Net replacement rates 
2)
In 1000 RR Low Medium High Low Medium High
Belgium 272 59 63 22 8 60 60 63
Denmark 123 87 71 13 16 89 85 75
France 1686 53 76 14 7 58 41 27
Germany 1790 72 89 6 4 74 58 66
Greece 286 56 56 34 10 64 38 49
Ireland 148 76 79 17 3 76 75 32
Italy 2283 42 65 27 3 44 39 19
Luxembourg 4 49 95 n.a. 5 50 n.a. n.a.
Netherlands 426 53 41 51 7 56 54 51
Portugal 242 68 94 6 n.a. 70 78 n.a.
Spain 1701 61 83 8 9 61 69 55
UK 1865 70 81 14 4 76 50 73
EU 12 10828 64 76 17 6 67 51 53
1) The shares may not always add up to 100 because of missing information on education level.
2) The net replacement rates have been calculated for each group separately by comparing the average
out-of-work income of each group of unemployed with the average in-work income of the respective
group of employed.
In a comparison of the in- and out-of-work income, it is interesting to analyse the
compensation systems according to the level of education. This qualification is
dominant when considering hiring possibilities in the labour market and can be
interpreted as a proxy for a skill level.10 On the other hand, social and tax policies
often aim to ensure a minimum or fair income maintenance irrespective of the wage
level, and thereby yielding a better replacement for low-paid employees with an
undesired side-effect of lower work incentives for low-skilled people. When
calculating these net replacement rates, the average income of the unemployed
belonging to a given education category is divided by the average income of the
employees belonging to the same education category.
In all countries except the Netherlands unemployment is concentrated amongst people
with a low education level. On average, 71 per cent of the unemployed had a low
education level, 19 per cent a medium and 9 per cent a high education. The share of
low-educated unemployed was over 80 per cent in Germany, Luxembourg and
Portugal and additionally amongst low-income households also in Spain and the
United Kingdom. The Netherlands was a clear outlier of this pattern; a good 50 per
cent of the unemployed had a medium education level and only a good third had the
lowest education level. Greece was the other country with a low level education share
less than 50 per cent of all unemployed. The pattern of unemployment according to
                                                          
10  Low-level of education means that one has a primary education and possibly vocational training in
the work environment but no institutional vocational education; medium-level education means an
attainment of vocational education in school; high level of education means an attainment of
college or university level education.41
education level was very similar in the sub-population of low-income households,
being only a little more concentrated in low education level.
In the majority of countries, there seems to be a pattern of higher replacement rates for
lower-educated unemployed. However, in Luxembourg, Italy and Belgium, the
highest net replacement rates were found in the group with the highest education, even
though the difference was only minor. The same pattern of replacement rates, with a
clearer difference in favour of low-educated unemployed, was also found in the sub-
population of low-income households.
7DEOHD 1HWUHSODFHPHQWUDWHV55RIXQHPSOR\HGLQGLYLGXDOVDFFRUGLQJWRVH[DQGDJH
$OOKRXVHKROGVPDOHV
Both sexes All males Share of unemployed males Replacement rates 
1)
Average RR % of all UE RR < 30 31 - 45 > 45 < 30 31 - 45 > 45
Belgium 47 40 46 37 26 37 50 50 45
Denmark 74 47 69 31 37 32 72 65 75
France 49 48 48 45 33 22 45 54 56
Germany 55 50 56 31 24 45 54 62 55
Greece 46 41 49 55 27 18 54 53 49
Ireland 51 77 47 42 38 19 57 49 40
Italy 45 53 45 61 19 20 43 43 62
Luxembourg 38 63 35 53 33 14 37 38 39
Netherlands 49 35 52 38 36 26 58 57 63
Portugal 54 43 58 42 27 31 62 55 58
Spain 44 54 49 49 30 21 59 49 47
UK 56 77 47 45 29 27 37 70 30
EU 12 52 53 51 46 27 27 48 58 49
$OOKRXVHKROGVIHPDOHV
Both sexes All females Share of unemployed
females Replacement rates 
1)
Average RR % of all UE RR < 30 31 - 45 > 45 < 30 31 - 45 > 45
Belgium 47 60 52 38 39 23 52 61 40
D e n m a r k 7 4 5 3 8 23 63 13 38 7 8 2 8 6
France 49 52 53 47 32 21 53 63 49
G e r m a n y 5 5 5 0 6 23 03 04 05 7 7 2 5 7
Greece 46 59 48 65 26 8 59 48 45
Ireland 51 23 48 84 12 4 53 57 37
I t a l y 4 5 4 7 4 66 62 21 35 5 4 2 4 9
Luxembourg 38 37 45 41 41 18 43 47 40
Netherlands 49 65 50 19 52 29 46 58 41
P o r t u g a l 5 4 5 7 5 23 83 42 75 7 5 0 5 1
S p a i n 4 4 4 64 0 6 1 3 184 6 4 1 3 6
UK 56 23 78 43 32 25 45 123 58
EU 12 52 47 55 48 31 21 53 65 53
1) See footnote 2 in table 9.42
7DEOHE 1HWUHSODFHPHQWUDWHV55RIXQHPSOR\HGLQGLYLGXDOVDFFRUGLQJWRVH[DQGDJH
/RZLQFRPHKRXVHKROGVPDOHV
Both sexes All males Share of unemployed
males Replacement rates 
1)
Average RR % of all UE RR < 30 31 – 45 > 45 < 30 31 - 45 > 45
Belgium 59 46 57 36 28 36 52 61 56
Denmark
87 47 79 43 39 19 94 65 75
France 53 52 55 39 36 24 58 58 58
G e r m a n y 7 2 5 1 7 8 2 62 84 5 7 1 8 7 7 3
Greece 56 49 57 48 32 20 57 62 61
Ireland 76 85 70 34 45 21 80 71 53
I t a l y 4 2 5 5 4 3 6 22 11 6 4 1 3 9 5 6
Luxembourg 49 58 48 28 48 24 30 47 55
Netherlands 53 37 50 33 43 23 59 52 59
P o r t u g a l 6 8 5 0 6 8 4 23 02 8 6 5 7 1 7 0
S p a i n 6 1 5 8 6 8 4 83 22 0 7 8 7 0 7 3
UK 70 80 63 41 34 25 54 71 68
EU 12 64 58 64 44 31 25 61 69 67
/RZLQFRPHKRXVHKROGVIHPDOHV
Both sexes All females Share of unemployed
females Replacement rates 
1)
Average RR % of all UE RR < 30 31 – 45 > 45 < 30 31 - 45 > 45
Belgium 59 54 71 38 41 21 61 78 73
D e n m a r k 8 7 5 3 9 4 3 93 82 3 8 4 9 6 1 1 1
France 53 48 57 52 31 17 60 64 57
G e r m a n y 7 2 4 9 7 2 3 73 33 0 7 1 8 2 6 3
Greece 56 51 65 63 26 11 66 66 60
Ireland 76 15 67 90 8 2 58 106 86
I t a l y 4 2 4 5 4 7 6 72 21 1 6 8 3 1 5 1
Luxembourg 49 42 61 41 40 20 55 53 114
Netherlands 53 63 82 20 54 26 79 87 69
P o r t u g a l 6 8 5 0 7 1 3 94 02 2 5 2 8 0 9 7
Spain 61 42 57 62 29 9 64 55 52
UK 70 20 63 45 29 26 58 67 67
EU 12 64 42 64 51 31 18 64 71 64
1) See footnote 2 in table 9.
Unemployment was slightly dominated by males, with 53 per cent of all unemployed
in 12 Member States. However, in seven countries out of twelve, the majority of the
unemployed were women. Ireland and the United Kingdom were clear exceptions. In
these countries only 23 per cent of the unemployed were women. In the majority of
countries, the net replacement rates of women were higher than those of men but,
nevertheless, in absolute terms the benefit level was lower in all countries. The higher
replacement rates were mostly due to lower wage levels of women. Also, in the case
of the United Kingdom, structural differences like a low share of female unemployed,
who most likely received complementary means-tested benefits, contributed to the
great difference in replacement rates between men and women.43
In about half of the countries, unemployment was concentrated in the youngest age
group: almost half of the unemployed were under 30 years old. In many of these
countries, notably in Greece, Portugal and Spain the net replacement rates were also
the highest in this age group. Only in Germany unemployment was concentrated in the
oldest age group, both for men and women, but it was not accompanied with the
highest net replacement rate. Instead, in five other countries, the net replacement rates
were highest in the oldest age group for men but in no country for women. The
conservative expectation of the highest net replacement rates in the middle-aged group
(31-45) seemed to hold best for women, which was the case in seven countries, but for
men only in three countries.
In the sub-population of low-income households, The pattern of unemployment by sex
and age amongst the low-income households was very similar to that of all
unemployed. However, unemployment was more dominated by males; they formed a
majority in nine countries.
II.2.2.3. Distribution of out-of-work income relative to average in-work income
The results presented above implicate some variation in results according to various
characteristics. In the following, the total variation according to the benefit level
relative to the average in-work income is analysed.11  Then the population of
unemployed is distributed in 4 groups according to the level of their net replacement
rates (those unemployed receiving more than 100 per cent of the average in-work
income, between 70 and 100 per cent, between 50 and 70 per cent and less than 50 per
cent).
On average, two unemployed out of three received some benefits in the EU countries.
This pattern was the same amongst all unemployed and those in low-income
households. The take-up rate of benefits was over 90 per cent in four countries,
namely in Belgium, Denmark, Germany and Ireland. The lowest ratios were found in
Italy (21 per cent), Greece (43 per cent) and the Netherlands (49 per cent). These
results might be affected the discrepancies found in the unemployment figures
between the ECHP and Labour Force Surveys. It seemed evident that the ECHP
unemployment figures, which were far above those of Labour Force Survey in these
countries, also include non-employed people, LHpeople who are not actively seeking
for job and thereby not entitled to unemployment benefits. In the ECHP, they,
however, are reported as unemployed, and therefore, the take-up of benefits becomes
underrated.
                                                          
11 In this case, the out-of-work income of each unemployed (not the average out-of-work income of
all unemployed) is divided by the average in-work income of all employees when all households
are considered, and respectively, by the average in-work income of employees in low-income
households when the sub-population of low-income households is considered.44
7DEOH 'LVWULEXWLRQRIRXWRIZRUNLQFRPHRIXQHPSOR\HG
LQGLYLGXDOVUHODWLYHWRWKHDYHUDJHLQZRUNLQFRPH
$$OOKRXVHKROGV
The unemployed Share of unemployed with benefits
Receiving benefits Replacement rate
in 1000 % of all UE > 100 70 - 100 50 – 70 < 50
Belgium 498 92 5 11 25 58
Denmark 337 98 13 35 37 16
France 2707 87 9 11 18 62
Germany 2974 97 12 13 18 57
Greece 267 43 8 15 20 57
Ireland 227 92 5 17 21 57
Italy 830 21 10 11 15 64
Luxembourg 5 78 3 5 13 78
Netherlands 445 49 6 14 20 59
Portugal 300 69 9 11 27 53
Spain 1874 62 5 13 16 65
United Kingdom 2183 88 11 10 19 60
EU 12 12647 68 9 13 19 59
%/RZLQFRPHKRXVHKROGV
The unemployed Share of unemployed with benefits
receiving benefits Replacement rate
in 1000 % of all UE > 100 70 - 100 50 – 70 < 50
Belgium 257 94 10 23 25 42
Denmark 125 98 27 46 20 7
France 1466 86 10 17 16 57
Germany 1735 96 22 18 18 42
Greece 133 44 12 19 14 55
Ireland 138 91 23 28 10 39
Italy 437 19 10 10 12 68
Luxembourg 3 81 2 21 14 63
Netherlands 212 49 6 19 26 49
Portugal 165 67 16 29 20 35
Spain 1093 62 17 17 15 51
United Kingdom 1691 90 18 21 16 45
EU 12 7454 68 16 19 17 48
Around 60 per cent of the unemployed who received benefits had an out-of-work
income less than half of the average in-work income. The only exception was
Denmark where only one out of five or six unemployed had an income less than half
of the average in-work income and almost half of the unemployed had an income level
over 70 per cent of the average in-work income. High out-of-work income levels –
interpreted here as those with more than 70 per cent of the average in-work income -
were received by a good 20 per cent of unemployed who received benefits, which
meant 2.5-3 million unemployed in 12 EU Member States.45
Around one third of the unemployed in low-income households, which means 2.5
million people, had an out-of-work income more than 70 per cent of the average in-
work income in low-income households. In Denmark three unemployed out of four
had this income level and in Ireland half of the unemployed. 16 percent of the
unemployed had a higher out-of-work income than the average in-work income.
The numbers of high out-of-work income relative to the average in-work income
shall, however, not be interpreted to present the extension of work incentive problems.
In the above table the income of the unemployed is compared with the average income
of those in work, and not with the likely income which the unemployed could have if
they took a job. Basically, the incentive problem is connected with the actual or likely
wage level of each unemployed, and thus incentive problems may also appear
amongst those who had a relatively low income level in comparison with the average
in-work income level.
II.2.2.4. Summary of the results
The main conclusions of this study are the following:
·  The number of unemployed was considerably higher than according to Labour
Force Surveys: on average by 15 per cent in 12 Member States, but almost double
in Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal. This calls for great caution in
drawing conclusions on the living conditions of the unemployed.
·  A third (32 per cent) of individuals belonged to low-income households, LH the
disposable income was less than two thirds of the average disposable income,
ranging from 22 per cent in Denmark to 40 per cent in Portugal. The share of the
unemployed in low-income households was 59 per cent, almost twofold the share
of all individuals, ranging from 37 per cent in Denmark to 76 per cent in the
United Kingdom. This finding can be interpreted to give support to the perception
of coincidence of unemployment and low-income.
·  Unemployment was concentrated amongst the low-educated, and thereby also
amongst the low-skilled: about three out of four unemployed had a low education
level. Almost half of the unemployed were young, under 30 years old.
·  The take-up rate of benefits of all sorts (unemployment, housing, family
allowances, social assistance etc.) amongst the unemployed was 68 per cent on
average, twice as high as that of unemployment benefits alone. The take-up rate of
all benefits was over 90 per cent in Belgium, Denmark, Germany and Ireland, and
for low-income households also in the United Kingdom. The lowest rates were
found in Italy (21 per cent), Greece (43 per cent) and the Netherlands (49 per
cent). In fact, these were lowest in the countries where the greatest discrepancies
in unemployment figures between the ECHP and Labour Force Surveys were
found.46
·  Take-up rates of unemployment benefits amongst the unemployed were
remarkably different between countries and notably low in many countries.
However, the too high unemployment figures in some countries may lead to
erroneous conclusions on take-up rates.
·  The net replacement rate was on average 52 per cent and amongst low-income
households 64 per cent. High average net replacement rate for all unemployed was
found only in Denmark (74 per cent) and for the unemployed amongst low-income
households in Denmark (87 per cent), Ireland (76 per cent), Germany (72 per cent)
and the United Kingdom (70 per cent). The highest increases in replacement rates
for low-income households in comparison with those for all households were
found in Ireland (25 percentage points), and in Germany and Spain (17 percentage
points).
·  In the majority of countries net replacement rates were higher for low-educated
people than for those with medium or high level education. The results support the
pattern of higher net replacement rates for those with a lower wage and a lower
education level. The conservative expectation of the highest net replacement rates
in the middle-age group (31-45) seemed to hold best for women, which was the
case in seven countries, but for men only in three countries.
·  Around 60 % of the unemployed who received benefits had an out-of-work
income which was less than half of the average in-work income. A good 20 % of
the unemployed, about 2.5-3 million people, received an out-of-work income
which was over 70 per cent of the average in-work income. Among low-income
households, one third of the unemployed had an out-of-work income more than 70
per cent of the average in-work income in low-income households and 16 per cent
of the unemployed had a higher income than the average in-work income.
,, $QRWKHUDSSURDFKWR(&+3GDWD
A study assigned by the Directorate-General for Employment, Industrial Relations and
Social Affairs (later referred to as DG V study), also based on the ECHP data from
1993, compares the net income of the same persons who experienced both an
unemployment spell and an employment period during the same observation year.12
The income data relate to the average monthly net earnings from employment and the
average monthly net income when drawing benefits during unemployment. As regards
the benefits, those related to unemployment, whether as insurance-based benefits or as
assistance, were covered. However, the family-related benefits including housing
benefits were excluded. The population of this study was confined to those who had
experienced at least a three months’ unemployment spell and at least one month’s
full-time employment. The data did not allow the separation of those who had the
                                                          
12   European Commission (1998), ”Social Protection in Europe 1997”47
unemployment period after employment from those who were unemployed before
employment, both groups are included.  For the latter group, the replacement rate is
calculated from the accepted post-unemployment wage level, which can be described
as ex post replacement rate.
Similarly, as the study described in Chapter II.2.2 (later referred to as DG II study),
the DG V study relates to individuals, but in contrast with the DG II study, compares
the monthly income of the same individuals in different labour market situations,
whereas the DG II study compares the yearly income of different persons in different
labour market situations. The second major difference is that the DG V study excludes
family-related benefits and can be interpreted to compare net unemployment benefit
with net earnings. When these two approaches are compared with the modelled net
replacement calculations of stylised households, both differ from the model approach
in that they primarily attempt to measure individual net income, whereas the model
calculations attempt to catch the impact of unemployment on family income.
The definitions of different target groups and different income concepts warrant the
expectation of differences in results as well. The DG V comparison (confined to
individuals having been both unemployed and employed) gives a more restricted look
at the problem; as regards the income concept, it disregards the impact of family-
related benefits, and as regards the target groups, it is confined to those who move
from employment to unemployment or vice versa. Hence, one could expect that the
take-up rate of unemployment benefits should be higher in the target group of the DG
V study than among all unemployed (DG II study).  The exclusion of family-related
benefits gives cause to expect lower net replacement rates, however, different target
groups may offset, at least partly; this impact.
The number of unemployed people in 10 EU countries (Luxembourg and the
Netherlands as well as the new Member States Austria, Finland and Sweden
excluded) examined in the DG V study was 4.1 million of which 2.8 million received
unemployment benefits. These unemployed represented 22 per cent of those examined
in the DG II study.48
7DEOH 1HWUHSODFHPHQWUDWHVDQGWDNHXSUDWHVRI
8QHPSOR\PHQWEHQHILWVLQ'*9DQG'*,,VWXGLHV
1HWUHSODFHPHQWUDWH
7DNHXSUDWHRI
XQHPSOR\PHQWEHQHILWV
7DNHXSUDWHRIDOO
EHQHILWV
DG V DG II, all
households
DG V DG II DG II
Belgium 48 47 91 83 92
D e n m a r k 7 07 49 8 8 0 9 8
France 66 49 67 39 87
G e r m a n y 5 55 58 9 6 0 9 7
Greece 26 46 28 11 43
Ireland 55 51 84 76 92
I t a l y 4 94 52 6 4 2 1
Luxembourg .. 38 .. 8 78
Netherlands .. 49 .. 29 49
P o r t u g a l 7 55 42 8 2 5 6 9
S p a i n 5 54 45 3 3 4 6 2
United Kingdom 20 56 89 20 88
EU 12 49 52 67 33 68
The figures in table 12 compared with the figures of the DG II study show remarkable
differences in results. The take-up rates of unemployment benefits were much higher
(67 per cent) in the DG V study than in the DG II study (33 per cent) in all countries.
Yet, the average take-up rate remained relatively low. This was affected by very low
take-up rates, less than one third, in Greece, Italy and Portugal, whereas they were
over 80 per cent in five countries (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland and United
Kingdom). The most striking difference between the two studies was apparent in the
United Kingdom where the DG V study showed the take-up rate of 89 per cent whilst
the DG II study showed 20 per cent. Italy, Greece and Portugal showed the lowest
take-up rates in both analyses.
Average unemployment compensation relative to earnings according to the DG V
study is a little lower than according to the DG II study. This is unexpected because
the DG II study covers all unemployed, whereas the DG V study only those who were
both unemployed and employed during the reference year, and thus the majority of
these unemployed likely received benefits which were not yet phased out due to a
lengthy unemployment spell. The result can be explained by a narrower disposable
income concept, which in the DG V study included only net unemployment benefits
and excluded family-related benefits. The expectation of higher replacement rates
holds only in three countries, namely in France, Portugal and Spain. In these countries
the inclusion of all unemployed (in the DG II study) may lead to a marked decrease of
net replacement rates, because in these countries the benefit level is gradually phased
out over the unemployment spell. For about a half of the countries, the compensation49
rates13 were at about the same level as net replacement rates for all unemployed in the
DG II study.
Moreover, the compensation rates in Greece and the United Kingdom were far below
the average net replacement rates of the DG II study. The mismatch in results is most
prominent in the United Kingdom where, according to the DG V results, the take-up
rate was very high but the compensation rate very low, whereas the DG II study
showed rather opposite results. It is likely that the exclusion of family-related benefits
contributes a lot to a low compensation rate in the DG V study. According to an
OECD study (OECD 1997), for instance, in a British family of a one earner couple
with two children, the income during unemployment consists of unemployment
benefits only for one half and of housing and family allowances for the other half.
,, 6ZHGLVKFDVHVWXG\
The Swedish Ministry of Finance conducted quite recently a study on work incentives
in the Swedish tax-benefit system.14 This offers an interesting enlargement to the
above described empirical analysis for two main reasons. Sweden was not included in
the ECHP survey but is a country with a Nordic type social protection system, of
which only Denmark was included in the ECHP survey. The study was based on
empirical data. In this respect the study had very similar aims as the studies based on
the ECHP data but made a number of additional controls of the impact of various
variables and applied several methods in order to compute individual net replacement
rates. The most interesting one of these was the application of a microsimulation
model.
The study was based on the Swedish Income Distribution Survey data from 1994,
which is a national equivalent for ECHP data. It was not confined to only a simple
comparison of disposable income of unemployed and employed households which
corresponded the DG II approach. Due attention was paid to the complexity of this
kind of comparison. One can always find shortcomings in different approaches and all
factors affecting income formation cannot be controlled in the way that the “pure”
effects of unemployment on income could be caught. One of the shortcomings of a
statistical comparison is that the groups of unemployed and employed can differ from
each other systematically in many respects. For example, it was recognised that the
unemployed in Sweden were seven years younger on average than the employed.15 As
                                                          
13   The concept of compensation rate is used in the original source similarly as net replacement rate in
this study. Due to different content of the concepts, it is justified to make a conceptual distinction
between them as well.
14  Ministry of Finance (1997), “Lönar sig arbete?”, Ds 1997:73 ESO, Sweden
15   As the wages tend to increase when work experience accrues, the simple comparison of the income
of the unemployed with that of the employed underestimates the net replacement rate. An
experiment considering merely the adjustment of age profiles resulted that the non-adjustment of
age profiles for single person households underestimates the net replacement rate by 6-7 percentage
points.50
with age, other characteristics like sex, education, region, immigration, etc. can also
cause composition differences between the groups compared. Finally, according to the
study, original large differences in disposable income between the unemployed and
employed could mostly be explained by composition differences.
In addition, a microsimulation model was used in order to calculate experimentally
individual net replacement rates both for the employed and the unemployed
represented in the sample data. This was done based on the assumption that the labour
market status was changed. In the first simulation, all unemployed were given their
former wage, or in some cases, an estimated wage, and then all taxes, housing benefits
and child care fees were recalculated. In the second simulation, all employed were
assumed to become unemployed and to receive an unemployment benefit determined
by their wage, and then taxes and benefits also determined by new gross income were
recalculated.
7DEOH 6ZHGLVKQHWUHSODFHPHQWUDWHVIRUVRPHKRXVHKROG
W\SHVE\YDULRXVDSSURDFKHV
(PSLULFDOGDWD 6LPXODWLRQH[SHULPHQWV
Disposable income of the
unemployed relative to that
of the employed
Net replacement rate
when unemployment is
simulated
Net replacement rate
when employment is
simulated
Single person 71 66 77
Single parent with children 93 81 92
Couple without children 85 79 88
Couple with one child 86 80 91
Couple with two children 89 82 92
Couple with 3+ children 95 82 93
The most prominent result of table 13 is that different approaches gave very similar
results. The results of statistical comparison did not differ considerably from those
gained by simulation experiments.  This was partly a result of the adjustment of
composition differences, which, in fact, raised the empirical net replacement rates.
The experiment allows one to argue that when one excludes the composition
differences, and thus, comes closer to measure the ‘pure’ impact of unemployment,
also the results of different approaches converge.
The empirical net replacement rates were especially very close to the net replacement
rates simulated for the unemployed. The fact that the simulated replacement rates for
the employed were notably lower, about 10 percentage points, than those simulated
for the unemployed, is explained as being derived from selection effects: the
employed represented older persons with higher wages and a lower unemployment
risk.
When the Swedish results are compared with those of the ECHP survey, it is striking
that Swedish net replacement rates are so much higher, 85 per cent on average for the
unemployed, than in the countries included in the ECHP where the highest rates were51
74 per cent for Denmark and 56 per cent for the United Kingdom. One has to note that
a partial explanation for the higher Swedish rates is the exclusion of composition
differences.  However, also according to the net replacement calculations for stylised
households, Sweden has the highest rates and the differences observed between
Sweden and Denmark are in line with those found in stylised net replacement
studies.16
Moreover, the conclusions of the Swedish study stress the combination effects of
taxes, benefits, social assistance and childcare fees, because these are integral parts of
the social protection for the unemployed and other groups on social benefits. As such,
social security systems are designed to be reasonable but the interaction between tax
and benefit systems gives cause for system problems, specifically for certain groups of
people. Furthermore, the study provides evidence that there were notable numbers of
people who worked but who would had received almost the same amount if they were
unemployed as well as there were unemployed who could have increased their income
only marginally if they began to work. Still, for most wage earners in Sweden, it paid
to work.
,, &RPSDULVRQEHWZHHQHPSLULFDODQGVW\OLVHGQHWUHSODFHPHQWUDWHV
When comparing empirical and stylised net replacement rates, two completely
different methodologies are applied and compared. Therefore, it is not easy to find
proper summary measures for comparison purposes. Especially, the large variations in
family and duration compositions of unemployment, which is captured in summary
empirical measures, is difficult to display by stylised measures, which, by definition,
try to simplify complex situations. Additionally, stylised calculations were made at
household level whereas the empirical studies based on ECHP data played primarily at
individual level.
In the following, a tentative comparison between the approaches of DG II and DG V
is made with the OECD calculations. Among the OECD calculations, there are two
benchmarks: the net replacement rate of the first month of unemployment and that of
the 60
th month. While the DG II approach covers all unemployed, neither the first
month’s nor the 60
th month’s rate perfectly correspond to the “average” duration of
unemployment in real data. The approach of DG V is closer to the first month of
unemployment, because the study was confined to those having been both
unemployed and employed during the reference year.
                                                          
16  See, for instance, OECD and Seven Country Group studies.52
7DEOH &RPSDULVRQRIHPSLULFDODQGVW\OLVHGQHWUHSODFHPHQWUDWHV
6W\OLVHGVWXGLHV (PSLULFDOVWXGLHV
2(&'$3:ZDJHOHYHO (&+3GDWD
(8FRXQWULHV
1st month of
unemployment
60th month of
unemployment DG II study DG V study
Austria 63 61 .. ..
B e l g i u m 6 15 84 74 8
D e n m a r k 7 07 47 47 0
Finland 75 81 .. ..
France 76 46 49 66
G e r m a n y 7 26 65 55 5
Greece .. .. 46 26
Ireland 49 49 51 55
I t a l y 4 254 5 4 9
Luxembourg 87 66 38 ..
Netherlands 79 71 49 ..
Portugal 78 2 54 75
S p a i n 7 43 54 45 5
Sweden 78 82 .. ..
United Kingdom 61 64 56 20
The above comparison shows that there is a fair match between the empirical and
stylised net replacement rates in half of the countries. The Danish and the Irish results
are identical, and there is a good match in Italy as well. In a number of countries,
namely in France, Portugal and Spain, the empirical results can be interpreted to be
consistent with stylised calculations when the phasing-out of the benefit level over the
unemployment spell is taken into account: empirical results show lower replacement
rates than the stylised calculations for the first month’s replacement but higher than
for the sixtieth month’s replacement. However, in the other half of the countries, the
empirical net replacement rates are significantly lower than the stylised ones. In
particular, the results for the Netherlands and Luxembourg are inconsistent: the ECHP
survey shows very low replacement rates, whereas the stylised calculations show high
ones. Also in Belgium, Germany and the United Kingdom the empirical results show
somewhat lower replacement rates.
There is less variation in empirical average rates between countries; they tend to
concentrate around the rate of 50 per cent, with the exceptions of Luxembourg (38 per
cent) and Denmark (74 per cent). Instead, the stylised net replacement rates are spread
over a wider range of 61-87 per cent in the first month of unemployment (except in
Italy (42 per cent) and Ireland (49 per cent)) and over the range of 46-82 per cent in
the sixtieth month (except in Portugal (2 per cent), Italy (5 per cent) and Spain (35 per
cent)).
One has to pay due attention to that the empirical figures were calculated for those
receiving benefits. In many countries the take-up rates of benefits were notably low.
One obvious reason for this is that the empirical data tend to show the unemployed in
a broader sense also possibly including non-employed persons. In addition, the
differences may also arise from the availability of benefits, which are affected, apart
from the pure eligibility rules, also by other reasons, HJ., the administration of53
benefits. All in all, one can conclude that there are notable differences between
empirical and stylised results.
Nevertheless, the empirical results do not warrant saying that the net replacement rates
for stylised households were unrealistic. Moreover, the Swedish case study shows
very consistent results of empirical and simulated approaches. It is not possible to say
whether the Swedish results match better due to essential differences in tax-benefit
systems like the take-up rates of benefits in Sweden, on the one hand, and in the
countries covered in the ECHP, on the other. However, these results call for further
efforts to study the factors which possibly cause differences in results. First, a better
control of other factors than the labour market status when the groups of unemployed
and employed are compared should be taken. The Swedish study gives implications
that a large part of income differences are due to composition differences in
comparison groups. Second, the take-up rate of benefits needs to be examined more
carefully. Strikingly low take-up rates in many countries demand better explanations
as to whether it is really so and why.
There is evidence on notable dispersion of out-of-work income relative to average in-
work income. However, this cannot be interpreted as distribution of net replacement
rates because out-of-work income is not compared with the likely or actual in-work
income of the same individuals, and thus it does not reveal the extent of possible
incentive problems.  Only a microsimulation model based on empirical data offers a
possibility to examine the distribution of net replacement rates.54
,,, &21&/86,216$1')857+(55(6($5&+
A first comparison of empirical results with the stylised calculations gives a result that
replacement rates may actually in many countries be lower than those calculated for
stylised households. Empirical results also suggest that the take-up rates of
unemployment benefits amongst the unemployed are notably low in many countries
and that there are marked differences between countries. However, the take-up rates of
benefits of all sorts are considerably higher. The take-up figures should be interpreted
only with great caution, because there are obvious discrepancies in the concept of
unemployment between the ECHP and Labour Force Survey. In some countries, the
differences are moderate and can reflect differences which are also found between the
national administrative sources and the Labour Force Survey. In some other countries,
however, (Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Portugal), the unemployment
figures are far too high, and thus risk erroneous conclusions on living conditions of
the unemployed or on the calculation of take-up rates.
A great number of variables affecting the comparison could not be controlled in the
above studies based on ECHP data. The strength of actual data in capturing the
variation of family and unemployment situations is also a limitation in a comparison
with stylised calculations. There are notable difficulties in correctly defining the
groups of households which can properly be compared with each other on the basis of
empirical data. Further empirical work needs to take better control of individual and
household characteristics affecting the composition of the groups to be compared.
The scope of the work incentive problem cannot be confined solely to unemployment
benefit systems. Tax-benefit systems have a wide interaction, not only between each
of the benefit systems and the taxation but also between various benefit systems.
There may be differences between countries as to which extent they offer substituting
benefits to the unemployed such as special allowances to laid-off people, training
allowances or social assistance. Moreover, some other benefits like disability or early
retirement benefits may substitute unemployment benefits but, when doing so, they
change the labour market state of the individual. For instance, OECD (1996a) and
Eight Countries Group (1997) point out that these types of non-employment benefit
may sometimes be used as substitutes for unemployment benefits and those receiving
these benefits but defined as non-employed can be affected by work incentives as
well. Hence, both the scope of benefits and the target population should be
reconsidered.
The household level approach should be preferred also in empirical calculations. It is
evident that taxes and family-related benefits are an integral part of the social
protection system which influences the disposable income of the family of the
unemployed and thereby also the work incentives of unemployed family members.
Behavioural responses were not the subject of this study. The net replacement rates
alone do not allow conclusions to be drawn on the probability of the labour market55
transitions. However, the relationship between wage and benefit levels is one factor
which affects the functioning of the labour market. Studies have found modest
positive relationships between the level of benefit and the duration of unemployment
but a clearer relationship between the duration of benefit and duration of
unemployment. Moreover, this relationship can also influence wage bargaining and
wage formation.17 Hence, measurement of incentives stays a meaningful task for
economic research.
The above-mentioned studies have promoted methodological discussion on
measurement of net replacement rates. The calculations of the OECD, the Seven
Countries Group and the Central Planning Bureau have contributed to finding a more
established basis for calculations and created a framework for cross-country
comparisons. Even though there are small differences in assumptions, the results are
robust. The approach of stylised net replacement calculations is useful when
interpreted as how the systems have been designed to work and how the interaction of
tax-benefit systems affects the final outcome.
International comparisons of the incidence and distribution of high net replacement
rates have suffered from the lack of appropriate data. The ECHP improves the
situation in this. An important aspect of the ECHP data is that, in future, it will allow
the same individuals to be followed over time and thus will provide information on
the transitions in and out of employment as well as on the income received in different
situations. The advantages of the panel structure of the sample have not yet been
exploited but invite analysing of labour market transitions and their underlying
factors.
Statistical comparisons do not provide a comprehensive method for analysing work
incentives in tax and benefit systems. The simulation technique applied in the
calculations of net replacement rates for stylised households can be applied together
with empirical data as well. Many countries already regularly apply microsimulation
analysis in tax and benefit reform designing. Such models enable account to be taken
of all interactions of taxes and benefits as well as enabling experiments to be made by
changing the labour market status of persons. Thus, for each individual and household
in the sample, the impact on net income can be simulated when a transition from
employment into unemployment or vice versa is assumed. When the model is based
on micro-data, it results, in this example, in new information of the actual level and
distribution of net replacement rates for actual unemployed people. 18
More research on behavioural responses to policy changes would seem to be required.
In order to say more on the actual influence of benefits on labour market transitions,
                                                          
17  See the annex: Message from literature.
18 Apart from the models already built for single countries, a multi-country project is being settled,
which is aimed at constructing an integrated benefit-tax model (called EUROMOD) for all EU
countries, building on existing households survey data and focused on social and integration
policies (see Sutherland, 1996 and 1997). Dynamic models including behavioural responses have
been built, for instance, in Australia (DYNAMOD; see NATSEM: Technical Paper series) and
Canada (DYNACAN; see Chenard, 1995) and USA (CORSIM; see Caldwell et al., 1996).56
the probabilities of the labour market transitions should be known. The longitudinal
data are crucial for examining labour supply parameters. When these are known,
behavioural modules can be incorporated further into microsimulation models, and
thereby make them more advanced in allowing, for instance, examination of labour
market responses of individuals to policy changes. These kinds of model would be
powerful tools in providing actual data on households and their work patterns in
combination with simulation models for tax-benefit rules and behavioural responses.5758
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Since the late 1970s, much literature has been dedicated to the analysis of the impact
of unemployment benefits on unemployment. In particular, this has been achieved
through a lot of empirical research. Most of the studies analysed the correlation
existing between unemployment benefits (in both level and duration) and observed
unemployment spells. Some have studied the impact of benefits on the probability to
exit from unemployment.
1DUHQGUDQDWKDQHWDO carried out in 1982 the first relevant study to analyse
the impact of unemployment benefits on unemployment on the basis of a longitudinal
data set which contained precise information on actual benefit receipts in the United
Kingdom.19 The object of their investigation was to establish the determinants of the
duration of the unemployment spell experienced by the sample after their entry into
registered unemployment in the autumn of 1978. They calculated the probability of
leaving unemployment as the product of the probability of receiving a job offer and
the probability that such an offer would be accepted.
The main conclusions of their study were:
· The elasticity of expected registered unemployment duration for men with respect
to unemployment benefits was 0.28-0.36. This result is very well defined and
highly robust.
· The effect of unemployment benefits varies with age. The elasticity expected
duration with respect to benefits is 0.65 for teenage men, 0.47 for men of 20-24
years, 0.26 for men of 25-44 years and 0.08 for men over 45 years.
· Benefits have no impact on the conditional probability of leaving unemployment
for the long-term unemployed (over six months) except in the case of teenagers.
· The conditional probability of leaving unemployment shows no sign of decreasing
with duration. This provides strong evidence that reservation wages fall with
duration.
· There is very little evidence to support the view that benefits effects are greater for
those whose benefit replacement ratio is already high.
&DSHQHWDO used data from the 1976 wave of the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics to study the effect of unemployment insurance benefits on weeks worked in
the US and they found empirical support for a negative relationship between the two
variables. &HWHULVSDULEXV, individuals who received benefits during their period of
unemployment worked 2.1 weeks less, on average, than non-covered workers. If the
average full-time worker is employed for 50 weeks per year, then unemployment
insurance appears to reduce employment by 4.2 per cent for workers receiving
                                                          
19 This is the DHSS Cohort Study of the Unemployed, which is a sample of the inflow into registered
unemployment of 2,300 men taken in the autumn of 1978.63
unemployment insurance benefits. Moreover, the examination of the coefficients of
the wage rate and non-wage income variables showed that the relationship between
weeks worked and non-wage income is negative, while that between weeks worked
and wage rate is positive (non-wage income elasticity and wage elasticity are
calculated to be respectively -0.08 and 0.05 per cent). Interesting findings were found
when comparing recipients and non-recipients of unemployment insurance: the
income elasticity of a beneficiary’s weeks worked is more negative than that of non-
recipients, which means that recipients of insurance benefits respond more negatively
in terms of weeks worked than do non-recipients of these benefits.20
.DW] DQG 0H\HU  examined the impact of the potential duration of
unemployment insurance benefits on unemployment in the US. By using a large
sample of households heads, they found that sharp increases in the escape rate from
unemployment both through recalls and new job acceptances were apparent for
unemployment insurance recipients around the time of benefits exhaustion, while such
increases were not apparent at similar points of spell duration for non-recipients.
Moreover, through their analysis of accurate administrative data from 12 states, they
found that a one week increase in potential benefit duration increases the average
duration of the unemployment spells of insurance benefit recipients by 0.16 to 0.20
weeks.
In order to measure the correlation between benefits and aggregate unemployment
rates, 2(&' modelled unemployment rates as a lagged function of benefits
entitlements in cycle-average data. The lagged measure of benefit entitlements is
defined as the average of the current summary measure of entitlements (i.e. the
average of nine H[ DQWH replacement rates calculated for three duration periods in
unemployment crossed by three family situations) two, four and six years previously.
As a result, replacement rates and duration of benefits affect unemployment rates with
an elasticity of 1 or slightly more.
Using hazard models based on survey data to analyse unemployment duration in
Spain$KQDQG8JLGRV2OD]DEDO found that unemployment benefit has a large
negative effect on the probability of leaving unemployment. However, they stress that
this effect is mostly due to the reduced exits from the labour force, while the
disincentive effect on unemployment is much less significant. In fact, they calculated
that, while the transitions from unemployment into employment are reduced by 25 per
cent for individuals receiving unemployed benefits, the exit rate from the labour force
is reduced by 50 per cent during eligible periods than ineligible periods. This suggests
that “many jobless people who decide to leave the labour force delay their actions
until they exhaust their unemployment benefits” (p. 258).
$UHOODQR HW DO  carried out an empirical study for Spain to estimate the
influence on the hazard of leaving unemployment of individual characteristics -
especially whether the worker receives benefits or not - and of the business cycle,
                                                          
20 The decrease in weeks worked determined by a 1 per cent increase in non-wage income is larger
for UI beneficiaries than for non-beneficiaries (the income elasticities being respectively -0.2 and -
0.03 per cent), while the opposite result was discovered in a comparison of the wage elasticities of
the two equations (0.04 per cent for  recipients and 0.07 per cent for non-recipients).64
while controlling for duration dependence. The study is based on a newly released
dataset of a rotating panel sample of unemployed men from the Spanish Labour Force
Survey during the period 1987-1994. The findings of their experiment indicate that
receipt of unemployment benefits significantly reduces the hazard of leaving
unemployment. The reduction in the hazard falls as duration increases, closing up
after one year of unemployment. As to the sign of the relationship between the
business cycle and re-employment hazards, their results suggest a positive
relationship, which means that favourable business conditions tend to increase the
hazard. However, changes in the state of the business cycle affect the hazard of
leaving unemployment to a significantly lower degree than the receipt of
unemployment benefits. Therefore, they concluded that “for assessing the chances of
re-employment of a given individual, it appears much more important to know
whether he is receiving benefits than the state of the business cycle” (p. 34).
Commenting on the inadequacy of the measures of replacement rates presenting high
values, 'LOQRWDQG0RUULV, stressed that they failed to take account of the
expected future changes, that no discounting procedure was adapted and that tax
rebates are either ignored or inadequately treated.
Using a theoretical analysis based on the job-search model, %HQ+RULP DQG
=XFNHUPDQ  showed that unemployment insurance benefits could even
decrease the expected duration of unemployment induced by search. An unemployed
person who has to finance search from limited resources may use the benefits to
intensify search effort and lower the expected duration of unemployment.
On the basis of a review of the literature on determinants of unemployment duration,
/D\DUGHWDO conclude that the elasticity of expected duration with respect to
benefits is generally in the range 0.2-0.9 depending on the state of labour market and
the country concerned.
On the basis of an extensive review of literature on that topic, %ODQNDQG)UHHPDQ
 conclude that there is little evidence of a significant trade-off between social
programmes and labour market adjustment: even if there is some evidence showing
the behavioural responses to the incentives of unemployment benefits programmes, no
definitive consensus has been yielded over whether the magnitude of this response is
large or small. In line with this conclusion, 0RIILWW (1992) has summarised the
literature on the effect of welfare support on the labour supply of recipients in the US
by stressing the “considerable uncertainty regarding the magnitude of these effects”
(p. 16).
$WNLQVRQDQG0LFNOHZULJKW gave a critical review of the traditional trade-off
between the adequacy of the benefit levels and their disincentive effect in increasing
unemployment at the expense of employment. According to them, this is a dangerous
oversimplification and they point to two main misleading features of the trade-off
view. First, both unemployment and employment are not homogeneous: it is necessary
to distinguish several different labour states in order to allow for a richer treatment of
the labour market. Secondly, they stress on the importance of the institutional features
of unemployment compensation, in particular with respect to the distinction between
insurance and assistance, considering that the trade-off view mistakenly assumes that65
the impact of unemployment compensation can be summarised in terms of the level of
benefit.
Atkinson and Micklewright conclude that the findings of much of the literature on the
effect of unemployment benefits levels or replacement rates on the probability of exit
from (and entry to) unemployment, are far from robust. In focusing on benefit levels,
this treatment ignores other dimensions of unemployment compensation, whose
effects may be more important (i.e. the influence of benefit duration). It takes too
simplistic a view of the way in which unemployment benefit works in the real world.
Finally, exit from unemployment may have quite different consequences depending on
the destination. This review of the evidence leads them to conclude that there may be
adverse effects on the incentive for the unemployed to leave unemployment, but that
these are typically found to be small and that there is little ground for believing that
much voluntary quitting is induced by the unemployment insurance system.
Moreover, the richer view of the relationship between unemployment compensation
and the labour market allows for identifying some of the ways in which it may have a
positive, rather than a negative, impact. Unemployment insurance (more than
assistance) may have positive effects in encouraging labour force participation
(Friedman 1975) and favouring regular rather than marginal employment and, if
without an income test, it does not involve high marginal tax rates on the earnings of
other family members. In arguing for a richer view of both the labour market and of
unemployment compensation, they have also been arguing for greater care in making
international comparisons.
%OXQGHOOsummarises some of the most comprehensive analyses of the impacts
of unemployment durations and benefit levels. A wide range of studies have found
rather small effects of replacement rates on return to work probabilities. But since job
search within work can be as efficient as search during unemployment, the only effect
of replacement rates is through the value of  ‘leisure’, or perhaps more accurately the
value of non-market activities (looking after children etc.). The estimated elasticities
of exit from unemployment with respect to the net replacement rate for men can be
concluded to be around –0.5. This would imply that a 50 per cent rise in
unemployment income would reduce the exit probability by around 20 per cent in a
given period. However, he warns of the caveat that the analyses have ignored to look
at which labour market state the unemployed individuals are moving to. Given the
growing numbers in early retirement, long-term sickness and on training programmes,
the analyses miss important features of labour markets. Ignoring these alternative
labour market states probably results in under-estimates of the effect of
unemployment income on the return to work probability.
+DYHPDQ  DQG summarises discussions of strategies for employment-
centred social policy reform saying that no single policy is capable of assuring both
adequate income support to those without sufficient earnings (LH, poverty reduction)
and stimulating an increase in the employment of low-skilled workers. The “iron law”
of income support needs to be emphasised again: an income guarantee assuring all
citizens of an “adequate” level of living financed via a personal income tax requires a
structure of marginal tax rates implying substantial work disincentives. The higher the
guarantee, the more severe the work disincentives. High guaranteed incomes and
strong work incentives are incompatible objectives.66
/LQGEHFNargues that distortions connected with benefits are more far-reaching
than only the effects on labour supply, in particular, on hours of work which are most
often covered in studies of benefit disincentives. He assesses that the most severe
problem inherent in various benefit systems is probably that, like private insurance,
they are plagued with moral hazard, as the individuals are able to adjust their own
behaviour to qualify for benefits. The basic dilemma is that the more generous the
welfare state is the more people qualify for benefits and take them up.
%XWL )UDQFR DQG 3HQFK  summarise the message from literature on the
unemployment effects of benefits in the following:
(i) The estimated effects of the levels of benefits on the length of
unemployment are relatively modest. In some European countries, replacement
rates are high and, as a consequence, the disincentives are potentially
important, mainly for low-wage and ‘fringe’ workers as well as families with
children.
(ii)  The duration of benefit is generally estimated to have a significant affect
on the length of unemployment.
(iii) National institutional characteristics can considerably influence the effect
of unemployment compensation: the tighter the administration of benefits,
especially concerning job-search requirements, the lower the effect.
(iv) Unemployment compensation does not only affect the probability of
leaving unemployment for employment but also the whole range of labour
market transitions. For example, a cut in benefits will tend to reduce
unemployment also by increasing withdrawals from the labour market.